Four cryptocurrency security incidents exposed vulnerabilities in cross-chain bridges, account recovery systems, lending contracts and decentralized finance vaults. Today’s crypto security roundup covers Gonka’s reported recovery of funds following a $1.05 million Ethereum bridge exploit, LUKSO’s disclosure of 1.4 million LYX stolen from approximately 300 accounts, an expanded $955,000 loss estimate at Reental, and a $3.42 million K3 Capital vault drain in which automated trading bots captured much of the proceeds. The incidents involve seperate attack mechanisms, while the available recovery evidence varies substantially between projects.
Gonka reports full fund return after $1.05M bridge exploit
Gonka announced on November 19 that funds taken from its Ethereum bridge had been fully returned, hours after acknowledging an exploit involving compromised bridge authorization and unauthorized issuance of its wrapped WGNK token.
Blockchain security firm Blockaid first reported the incident at 18:28 UTC on November 18, estimating approximately $1.05 million in realized proceeds across five transactions. According to its investigation, an attacker changed the bridge’s epoch BLS group key, allowing unauthorized operations that drained remaining stablecoin reserves and minted unbacked WGNK.
The affected bridge connects Gonka’s native network, which supports decentralized artificial intelligence computing, with Ethereum. Under its normal design, native GNK is locked in escrow before a corresponding amount of WGNK is issued on Ethereum. Unauthorized minting breaks that relationship between wrapped tokens and their underlying backing.
Gonka publicly acknowledged the attack shortly after midnight UTC on November 19 and gave the attacker 12 hours to return the assets. The project subsequently told users to avoid trading WGNK, interacting with the bridge or maintaining liquidity positions involving the affected token. It also said its native network consensus and inference services continued operating normally.
At approximately 09:14 UTC, Gonka published a short follow-up stating that the funds had been fully returned. It did not accompany the announcement with a detailed transaction-level accounting, an updated reserve balance or confirmation that the bridge had safely reopened.
The money came back, says Gonka, but the accounting hasn’t. The recovery statement leaves unresolved whether unbacked WGNK was burned, whether liquidity providers suffered losses during the incident and whether any holders who traded the affected token will receive compensation.
The incident follows other failures involving cross-chain bridge withdrawal verification, including an October attack on zkLink Nova involving approximately $783,100 in unauthorized withdrawals.
Gonka has not publicly established how the BLS group key was changed or whether all previously authorized credentials have been replaced. The US National Institute of Standards and Technology’s cryptographic key-management guidance addresses protection, compromise recovery and the management of keying material. A full reconcilliation of bridge reserves and confirmation of secure signing arrangements would provide stronger evidence of operational recovery than the return announcement alone.
LUKSO confirms 1.4M LYX theft through recovery backend
LUKSO disclosed that approximately 300 Universal Profiles were affected by an attack against its email-based account recovery system overnight between November 17 and 18. The attacker stole around 1.4 million LYX, according to the project’s November 18 post-mortem.
Universal Profiles are smart-contract accounts that support multiple authorized controller keys. LUKSO’s email recovery service was designed to help users regain access without requiring the original private key. The incident involved the backend responsible for authorizing those recovery operations, rather than a vulnerability in the underlying blockchain.
LUKSO said the attacker compromised the recovery service and used its permissions to add an unauthorized controller key to affected profiles. With that access, the attacker could authorize transfers from accounts whose recovery configurations had been exploited.
The project identified the unauthorized controller address as 0xa2f8Fd85366d1B4A3B13C33A48CD959F6D1Ba3a7 and instructed users who had enabled email recovery to remove both the attacker-controlled key and the malicious recovery controller. Simply disabling permissions was not sufficient under its published instructions.
According to LUKSO’s investigation, the stolen tokens were bridged to Ethereum and exchanged through decentralized exchanges, generating approximately 50 ETH, valued at roughly $95,000 at the time. That amount represents reported conversion proceeds rather than a comprehensive valuation of the 1.4 million LYX at prevailing market prices.
LUKSO permanently disabled the compromised email recovery service and said it was preparing reimbursement arrangements for affected users. It maintained that its blockchain, Universal Profile protocols and underlying smart contracts were not compromised, and that private keys and recovery phrases had not been exposed.
The chain held up; the recovery backend did not. Although LUKSO reported stopping the attack, accounts retaining unauthorized controller permissions may remain exposed to further transfers unless those permissions are removed.
The incident has parallels with the recent Keplr wallet security incident involving more than $6 million, where an external authentication and recovery arrangement became central to the response. The technical causes differ, but both cases demonstrate that account access systems can create risks beyond vulnerabilities in the underlying blockchain.
Reental’s Polygon drain estimate rises to $955,000
New blockchain analysis indicates that Reental’s Polygon-based RNT Lend platform experienced approximately $954,703 in stablecoin outflows on November 18, more than double the roughly $454,000 initially reported by Blockaid.
Bitquery reconstructed the incident using Polygon transaction records and identified two distinct groups of withdrawals. Approximately $454,825 went to two maximal extractable value (MEV) bots, while another $499,877 was extracted through transactions involving an address with Reental administrative privileges.
The attack began when the privileged administrator address upgraded the implementations behind the lending platform’s stablecoin markets. The replacement contracts enabled transfers without the normal access restrictions, allowing automated bots to reach the available USDT and USDC liquidity ahead of the administrator’s subsequent withdrawal attempts.
The bots emptied approximately $454,825 from the two lending markets within seconds. Bitquery subsequently traced another $499,877 through activity affecting 1,149 wallets created by Reental’s wallet infrastructure and four Safe wallets. Those funds were transferred away from Polygon using cross-chain bridges.
Twice the initial loss estimate, yes, but not twice the same pool exposure. The first figure principally captured the bot withdrawals from lending reserves, while the expanded accounting includes additional transfers from other Reental-linked accounts.
Bitquery also identified movements involving property-backed tokens valued at approximately $49.34 million using the lending platform’s internal token prices. Its investigation found that Reental recovered those tokens within about two hours through administrative actions involving its token-management infrastructure.
The $49.34 million figure should not be added to the stablecoin loss estimate. It represents internal valuations of property tokens that were reportedly recovered, not a verified cash loss or independent market valuation.
Before the drain, the lending markets contained approximately $10.01 million in deposits, of which around $9.57 million had been borrowed. The $454,825 cash reserve was therefore a small portion of total lender claims. Bitquery reported that the affected pool had not been paused at its 16:17 UTC November 18 observation point and that deposits or repayments could remain exposed under the compromised contract configuration.
The on-chain evidence identifies the administrator address involved but does not establish whether its credentials were stolen or used by an authorized insider. Reental had not publicly confirmed Bitquery’s expanded loss calculation in the reporting examined. The amount ultimately recoverable by lenders, and the status of the affected contracts after the investigator’s snapshot, remain unresolved.
K3 Capital loses $3.42M as MEV bots race to exploit sBOLD
K3 Capital acknowledged malicious activity involving its sBOLD vault on November 18 and announced that the affected contracts had been paused. Blockaid initially estimated the drain at approximately $3.43 million, while subsequent analysis by Bitquery placed the loss at roughly $3.42 million.
The sBOLD vault accepts deposits of Liquity’s BOLD stablecoin and distributes capital among stability pools associated with the Liquity V2 ecosystem. The vulnerability reportedly involved the vault’s share-pricing mechanism and the treatment of certain collateral balances during deposits and withdrawals.
Bitquery identified 97 exploit transactions involving six wallet groups between 12:25:23 and 12:33:35 UTC, a period of just over eight minutes. The activity drained nearly the entire BOLD balance held by the vault.
One automated copycat bot executed 57 of the identified transactions and extracted approximately $1.91 million, representing about 56% of the total vault loss. Ethereum block builders recieved roughly $1.78 million in transaction-ordering payments from competing exploit participants.
The bot extracted the biggest share, but much of that money went straight to block builders. The $1.91 million bot extraction and $1.78 million in builder payments overlap, rather than representing two seperate losses. According to Bitquery, builders and the bot’s remaining payout wallet collectively retained approximately 59% of the extracted value at its observation point.
The investigation also challenged Blockaid’s initial description of the attack as involving self-liquidations. Bitquery reported finding no liquidated Liquity troves during the drain, instead identifying transactions in which attackers supplied wrapped Ether directly to the vault before exploiting its share valuation.
A previous ChainSecurity audit had identified a related share-pricing weakness and recorded it as mitigated in a subsequent code version. The available investigation does not conclusively establish whether the exploited deployment retained the original weakness or contained a different implementation of the same economic issue.
Liquity separately stated that its core V2 protocol was unaffected and described sBOLD as an independently operated K3 Capital product. The attack therefore concerned the additional vault infrastructure rather than a confirmed compromise of Liquity’s underlying borrowing contracts.
The participation of automated exploiters recalls an earlier UNCX exploit involving copycat attackers and MEV bots, where revised transaction analysis materially increased the original loss estimate.
Across the four incidents, the confirmed technical failures concern different layers of cryptocurrency infrastructure: bridge authorization, account recovery permissions, privileged contract upgrades and vault accounting. Gonka has reported recovering its funds, LUKSO is developing compensation arrangements, Reental’s total stablecoin losses remain based on independent blockchain analysis, and K3 Capital has confirmed a contract pause without publishing a complete recovery accounting. The remaining records will determine how much of the extracted value can ultimately be restored to affected users.
Johan Shamshad is Editor-in-Chief at Dave Finances, covering financial markets, digital assets, trading platforms, brokers, fintech, payments and regulation. Since 2023, he has also worked as an editor at Gulf News, the UAE English-language newspaper published by Al Nisr Publishing LLC. His work focuses on market-moving developments, company disclosures, regulatory changes and trading infrastructure, with an emphasis on primary-source verification and practical context for traders and investors.

