Payment providers Paysafe and Xendit reported another series of disruptions on November 21–22, 2026, affecting QR transactions, bank payouts, virtual-account payments and digital wallets across Peru and Indonesia. Today’s payments roundup covers two failures involving Paysafe’s PagoEfectivo QR provider, a nine-hour Indonesian payout incident that expanded across several banking destinations, four Mandiri virtual-account interruptions and renewed DANA wallet and QR-payment problems. The companies confirmed service restoration, but their disclosures leave questions about repeated provider failures, transaction reconciliation and the number of payments affected.
Paysafe restores its primary QR provider twice in five hours
Paysafe experienced two separate disruptions involving its PagoEfectivo QR-payment provider on November 22, with both incidents prompting mitigation measures and eventual restoration of traffic to the primary processing partner.
The first incident, INC0331401, was identified at 05:32 UTC when Paysafe reported degradation at its QR-code partner. The company said it was initiating measures to redirect traffic to an alternative solution while its teams investigated the problem.
At 06:12 UTC, Paysafe confirmed that the provider had restored service and traffic had been switched back to the primary route. The published notification-to-resolution interval was 40 minutes, although the company did not establish the exact onset of the underlying technical failure.
Another incident followed at 09:10 UTC under reference INC0331406. This time, Paysafe confirmed successful rerouting to its alternative solution at 09:11 UTC, reporting that affected services were operational again.
At 10:11 UTC, the company announced that its original QR partner had recovered, allowing traffic to return to the primary provider once more.
The second incident therefore remained open for 61 minutes, but its public record shows that alternate routing restored service within one minute of the initial notification. The incident remained under monitoring until the primary provider returned.
It was back on the primary route, and then the trouble returned again.
The latest incidents extend a pattern documented in earlier PagoEfectivo QR-provider failures during November. On November 13, Paysafe similarly confirmed successful failover to an alternative provider before returning traffic to its primary route approximately half an hour later.
The recurring sequence raises a specific operational question about Paysafe’s failback decisions. Its notices establish that an alternative processing route can restore affected services, but they do not explain what stability tests are performed before traffic is returned to the primary provider.
The company has not identified the upstream partner, disclosed the reason for the repeated degradation or provided payment-failure rates associated with the latest incidents. It also has not reported whether merchant transactions required reconciliation following the switches.
The incidents concern PagoEfectivo QR processing, rather than an established interruption across all Paysafe payment services. For investors in the publicly traded company, the disclosures document recurring problems within a particular payment route, without providing enough information to calculate lost processing revenue or additional operating costs.
Xendit payout disruption expands across Indonesian banks
In Indonesia, Xendit reported a payout-processing incident beginning at 20:00 Western Indonesian Time (WIB) on November 21 and continuing until 05:00 WIB on November 22.
The disruption initially involved delayed BCA transfers in two transaction-value bands: IDR 5,000–9,999 and IDR 100,000,001–1 billion.
By 23:00 WIB, Xendit’s affected-destination list had expanded to include BNI, Mandiri and other banks and electronic wallets. The company identified disruption to disbursements, remittances, escrow transfers and payouts, attributing the delays to system problems involving its partner.
At midnight, Xendit listed BCA transfers ranging from IDR 1 to IDR 1 billion, all BNI amounts, Mandiri transfers between IDR 5,000 and IDR 250 million, and other bank and e-wallet destinations up to IDR 250 million.
During subsequent updates, the affected transaction bands changed repeatedly. Permata appeared on the disruption list at 03:10 WIB, alongside other banking destinations.
By 04:00 WIB, the remaining listed problems had narrowed to BCA transfers between IDR 5,000 and IDR 250 million and BNI transfers above IDR 250,000,001. Xendit declared the incident resolved one hour later.
The list of affected banks kept changing through the night, and the amount ranges changed with it.
The nine-hour incident followed earlier Xendit payout disruptions involving BCA, BNI and Mandiri on November 18–19. Those incidents also featured changing transaction-value restrictions and delayed transfers.
The November 21–22 records establish that multiple destinations were affected within one incident. They do not establish whether a shared payout-processing dependency failed or whether the various banking routes experienced seperate but overlapping problems.
Xendit has not disclosed the number or value of delayed disbursements, the identity of its affected partner or the status of individual instructions awaiting completion after service restoration.
For businesses relying on Xendit for supplier payments, merchant withdrawals or remittances, the operational issue extends beyond the nine-hour reporting window. A resolved incident confirms the provider’s reported recovery, but does not establish whether every pending transaction was completed or whether further reconciliation was required.
Mandiri virtual-account payments fail four times
Xendit recorded four additional disruptions on November 22 affecting Mandiri virtual-account payments in Indonesia.
The first incident began at 12:15 WIB and was marked resolved at 12:16. A second started at 14:29 and ended at 14:30. Further interruptions were recorded between 17:40 and 17:43, and between 23:00 and 23:02.
All four incidents carried similar descriptions. Xendit attributed the interruptions to problems at its partner and warned that customers could not pay existing Mandiri virtual accounts during the disruption periods.
Successful virtual-account payments could also take longer to process, potentially delaying the confirmation of collections in merchant systems.
The four incidents totaled seven minutes between the published identification and resolution timestamps. That calculation excludes the intervals when service was reported operational and does not establish how long the underlying technical problems existed before detection.
Four interruptions, each resolved quickly, but four on the same day.
Xendit advised merchants to direct customers toward alternative payment channels while the incidents were active. Its notices did not identify the partner-side fault or explain why virtual-account availability deteriorated repeatedly after earlier recovery announcements.
The virtual-account failures were operationally distinct from the bank payout incident. The former affected incoming customer payments and their processing, while the earlier disruption concerned outbound transfers to Indonesian bank accounts and wallets.
Although both involved Indonesian banking infrastructure, Xendit has not published evidence linking the Mandiri virtual-account failures to the previous payout-processing problems.
DANA wallet returns HTTP 503 errors after QR failures
Xendit also reported further problems involving Indonesia’s DANA electronic wallet on November 22, with seperate incidents affecting QR-payment completion and the creation of e-wallet charge requests.
Two DANA QR incidents were identified at 05:09 and 05:36 WIB, with resolutions recorded at 05:11 and 05:37 respectively.
During those interruptions, Xendit reported that merchants could successfully initiate QR-payment transactions but were likely to receive delayed callbacks confirming payment completion. The company also said successful-payment rates had fallen below normal thresholds.
Xendit advised merchants to use alternative e-wallet providers and stated that transactions initiated during the incidents would require reconciliation, with further information to be provided in coordination with its wallet partner.
A payment could be initiated successfully, and the confirmation of that payment still not arrive when expected.
Later that day, Xendit identified another disruption affecting DANA e-wallet payments. The incident first triggered at 14:43:15 WIB and was publicly identified at 14:46.
According to Xendit, intermittent timeouts affected the creation of charge requests, with some transactions returning HTTP 503 responses and the error code CHANNEL_UNAVAILABLE.
The provider reported that more than 5.90% of requests during the preceding ten-minute observation window were affected. It marked the incident resolved at 14:56 WIB.
Unlike the QR incidents, Xendit instructed merchants to retry transactions receiving the 503 error and stated that post-incident reconciliation was not required for that particular disruption.
The differences in those instructions are operationally relevent. A failed charge-creation request can be retried under the provider’s guidance, while a transaction awaiting completion confirmation requires its final status to be established before merchants can reliably reconcile the payment.
The latest failures follow previous Xendit QR-payment and wallet disruptions in early November, when merchants were also warned about delayed transaction callbacks and instructed to reconcile payment statuses.
Indonesia’s Bank Indonesia QRIS framework identifies real-time transaction monitoring and reconciliation as important functions of standardized QR payments. The framework also sets system-reliability and risk-mitigation requirements for payment-service providers.
Those standards provide context for the payment-confirmation problems, but the incidents do not establish a regulatory violation or identify a failure of Indonesia’s QRIS infrastructure as a whole.
Xendit’s published records do not establish whether the DANA QR interruptions and subsequent wallet-request errors shared the same underlying technical dependency. No aggregate transaction count, confirmed duplicate-charge figure or financial-loss estimate was disclosed.
Across the November 21–22 incidents, both providers reported restoring their affected services, sometimes within minutes. Paysafe’s repeated return to its primary QR partner, Xendit’s changing bank-payout restrictions and the recurring Mandiri and DANA failures leave different questions about provider reliability and transaction handling.
The restoration notices confirm service recovery as reported by the companies. They do not provide a complete accounting of failed transactions, delayed payment confirmations or pending disbursements. Those transaction-level results remain unavailble in the public incident records.
Johan Shamshad is Editor-in-Chief at Dave Finances, covering financial markets, digital assets, trading platforms, brokers, fintech, payments and regulation. Since 2023, he has also worked as an editor at Gulf News, the UAE English-language newspaper published by Al Nisr Publishing LLC. His work focuses on market-moving developments, company disclosures, regulatory changes and trading infrastructure, with an emphasis on primary-source verification and practical context for traders and investors.

