Solana trading platform Proxima confirmed that attackers stole 5,324.2 SOL from 870 wallets after private keys were exposed through monitoring logs, while South Korean exchange Coinone disclosed that an intrusion at its outsourced customer-support provider exposed sensitive customer information. Proxima says all affected users have been reimbursed, with an independent security firm confirming the refunds on-chain. Coinone has reported no direct compromise of its trading or custody systems, but has not determined how many customers were affected.
Proxima confirms 5,324 SOL theft affecting 181 users
Proxima co-founder Theo published a detailed post-mortem late on November 14, confirming that attackers drained 5,324.2 SOL from 870 Solana wallets belonging to 181 users. The unauthorized transfers occurred between 03:22 and 05:42 UTC that day, with the stolen cryptocurrency worth approximately $400,000 at contemporaneous market prices.
The final figure was considerably higher than Proxima’s initial estimate of $200,000 to $250,000, announced earlier on November 14. The first number was lower, quite a bit lower, before the company disclosed the detailed wallet-level accounting.
According to the post-mortem, the affected wallets represented approximately 0.1% of wallets on the platform. The attackers stole SOL balances, while Proxima reported that token holdings and EVM balances were not compromised.
The company said it reimbursed all 181 affected users from its own treasury. On November 15, Pashov Audit Group independently confirmed that it had verified the reimbursements on-chain and that affected users were fully covered. The auditor’s public statement did not include a complete transaction-by-transaction reconciliation.
The refunds establish a materially different financial outcome from incidents in which customers must wait for stolen assets to be recovered. The approximately $400,000 represents the reported value of cryptocurrency stolen, not a confirmed permanent loss borne by users. Proxima has not disclosed whether the treasury-funded reimbursement will generate any recoveries from the attacker.
Private keys exposed through outdated SigNoz monitoring logs
Proxima’s investigation traced the compromise to a combination of debug logging, outdated monitoring software and a removed network security restriction.
During development of private-beta features, a diagnostic logging statement had been introduced that could record wallet private keys. The statement was not intended to operate in production, but Proxima said it became active after the production logging level was changed from information to debug mode for performance monitoring.
Private keys were subsequently written to monitoring logs between November 3 and November 10, with the exposure ending at approximately 13:20 UTC on November 10. The logs were retained for 15 days in a SigNoz monitoring instance configured by an external consultant.
Proxima said the monitoring deployment used an outdated software version containing a publicly known vulnerability, with an upgrade repeatedly postponed. A Cloudflare firewall rule that had restricted external access was also inadvertently removed, leaving the affected instance reachable from the public internet.
It was a monitoring system, not the Solana network itself, that gave the attacker access to usable wallet credentials.
The attacker was then able to extract stored keys and authorize transactions from affected wallets. Proxima’s account describes a vulnerability in its deployment of third-party monitoring software, not a confirmed compromise of SigNoz’s central infrastructure. The precise vulnerability and affected software version were not publicly identified.
The incident resembles the recently reported Keplr wallet attack involving exposed private keys, although the technical entry points differed. Keplr’s incident involved Web3Auth infrastructure supporting social-login wallets, whereas Proxima intially traced its losses to credentials recorded in observability logs.
In both cases, unauthorized possession of a wallet’s signing key could allow funds to be moved without exploiting the blockchain protocol. Restoring a software service or closing an external access route cannot revoke a private key already obtained by an attacker.
Proxima said it patched and isolated the affected SigNoz deployment, removed sensitive information from logging, rotated infrastructure credentials and invalidated sessions. The company also introduced additional authentication for private-key exports and created replacement wallets for affected users.
Automated trading activities, including autobuy, autosell and market-making sessions, were paused as part of the response. Users whose wallets were labelled compromised or potentially exposed were directed to use replacement addresses rather than resume activity with the original credentials.
The platform’s return to operation and completion of reimbursements therefore address different parts of the incident. The financial losses were covered, but a compromised private key remains unsafe for future transactions.
Coinone discloses customer-data breach at support contractor
South Korean cryptocurrency exchange Coinone announced on November 15 that an external attacker had accessed servers operated by MetaM, the company responsible for its outsourced customer-support operations.
According to Coinone’s Korean-language security notice, the unauthorized access occurred at approximately 04:00 Korea Standard Time on November 12. MetaM informed Coinone of the intrusion at approximately 09:20 that morning, while the exchange published its customer disclosure at 08:00 on November 15.
The attacker accessed or extracted information stored during previous customer-service interactions, including records submitted through telephone and online consultations.
Coinone identified the following categories of information as potentially exposed:
- Customer names, telephone numbers, email addresses and dates of birth.
- Bank-account numbers and residential addresses.
- South Korean resident registration numbers and identity-document issue dates.
- Passwords disclosed during customer-support conversations.
- Cryptocurrency wallet addresses and transaction identifiers.
The exchange stressed that the actual information exposed varies by customer, depending on what each individual had submitted during previous support interactions. Customers who never contacted the support center were not affected by the incident, according to Coinone.
There is no confirmed total for affected customers yet, and not every listed data field was necessarily exposed for every person.
Coinone said its exchange accounts, trading infrastructure and cryptocurrency wallet systems operate seperately from the compromised contractor environment. It reported no evidence of unauthorized access to those core systems.
The company also explained that account logins require additional verification through a registered one-time password or KakaoTalk authentication, and that suspicious login requests from unauthorized applications are automatically blocked.
These safeguards reduce the likelihood that exposed password information alone could enable an attacker to access customer balances. They do not eliminate the possibility that stolen identity details and support records could be used to impersonate customers or exchange representatives.
A previous Coinbase customer-data exposure involving Amplitude presented a comparable division between an exchange’s internal infrastructure and information processed by an outside service provider. In that incident, Coinbase also reported no compromise of its trading or custody systems, although the disclosed categories of customer information were narrower.
Coinone reports incident to Korean regulators
Following MetaM’s notificaton, Coinone said it blocked the attacker’s IP address, restricted access to the affected customer-support environment, strengthened suspicious-activity monitoring and temporarily moved customer service to email-based communication.
The exchange reported the incident to the Korea Internet and Security Agency, the Personal Information Protection Commission and the Financial Supervisory Service. It also began reviewing the contractor’s security arrangements and investigating the scope of the exposed records.
South Korea’s Personal Information Protection Act Enforcement Decree, Article 39, generally requires organizations to notify affected individuals within 72 hours after becoming aware of a personal-data breach, subject to specified exceptions.
Coinone’s public notice was posted approximately 70 hours and 40 minutes after the exchange says it learned of the incident. That places the publication within the general 72-hour period, although the public timestamp alone does not establish when individual customers were notified or whether all applicable obligations were fulfilled.
The timing is fairly close to the deadline, and individual notification is a different matter from publication of a general notice.
Coinone said it was preparing individual notifications or a data-exposure inquiry service to help customers establish which information may have been compromised. The exchange has not disclosed a completion date for that process or the number of records under investigation.
The exposure creates an identifiable risk of targeted impersonation. An attacker who possesses a customer’s contact details, previous support conversation and transaction identifiers could use that information to make a fraudulent message appear connected to a genuine account issue.
There is a documented precedent for third-party infrastructure compromises leading to fraudulent cryptocurrency communications. In September, the Brevo breach affecting 138 customer accounts resulted in unauthorized phishing messages being distributed through legitimate email infrastructure used by cryptocurrency companies, including Trezor and CoinTracking.
No evidence has emerged connecting the Coinone attackers with the Brevo incident, and Coinone has not reported a confirmed phishing campaign or account theft resulting from the MetaM exposure.
Coinone advised customers who had supplied passwords during support conversations to change those credentials, including reused passwords on other services. It also warned that the exchange does not request one-time passwords, verification codes, withdrawals or wallet-address changes through unsolicited communications.
For both incidents, the underlying security failures occurred outside the core blockchain infrastructure. The consequences, though, were different: Proxima’s exposed signing credentials enabled a confirmed cryptocurrency theft that the company subsequently reimbursed, while Coinone’s stolen support records remain a potential source of impersonation and identity fraud.
Proxima has disclosed a financial loss, a technical cause and a completed reimbursment process. Coinone has confirmed unauthorized access and potentially exposed data categories, but the full extent of the incident and any subsequent misuse remain undetermined.
The losses are not alike, and neither are the recoveries. Cryptocurrency stolen from Proxima’s users could be replaced from the company’s treasury; personal information exposed through Coinone’s contractor cannot simply be recalled after an attacker obtains it.
Johan Shamshad is Editor-in-Chief at Dave Finances, covering financial markets, digital assets, trading platforms, brokers, fintech, payments and regulation. Since 2023, he has also worked as an editor at Gulf News, the UAE English-language newspaper published by Al Nisr Publishing LLC. His work focuses on market-moving developments, company disclosures, regulatory changes and trading infrastructure, with an emphasis on primary-source verification and practical context for traders and investors.

