New cryptocurrency security advisories exposed malicious npm packages designed to steal wallet private keys through Telegram bots. This crypto security roundup examines a counterfeit Ethereum wallet library, malicious Base58 encoding dependencies and a newly disclosed package linked to an earlier malware campaign. The findings reveal multiple methods for intercepting sensitive wallet data, although researchers have not identified confirmed victims or quantified cryptocurrency losses.
Fake Ethereum wallet library sends private keys to Telegram
GitHub published a security advisory on November 17 identifying malicious code in ethers-wallet-latest version 5.8.0, an npm package designed to resemble the legitimate @ethersproject/wallet library.
According to the GitHub malware advisory GHSA-mh48-jfmg-8gjv, the counterfeit package copies the structure of @ethersproject/wallet 5.8.0 but inserts obfuscated JavaScript at the beginning of the Wallet constructor in its lib/index.js file.
Whenever an application executes new Wallet(privateKey, …), the injected code attempts to transmit the supplied private key through an HTTP POST request to a hardcoded Telegram bot.
One call to the constructor, and the private key goes out.
The advisory identifies Telegram bot 7837266935 and chat ID 7974622428 as the receiving infrastructure. Researchers also connected those identifiers to another malicious npm package, base60-58x, establishing a technical relationship between the two packages.
The malicious code operates inside the wallet-construction process rather than requiring a user to visit a phishing website or manually submit a recovery phrase. Applications that pass usable private keys to the compromised constructor could expose those credentials during otherwise ordinary operations.
The mechanism resembles an earlier Trezor phishing campaign involving Telegram-based recovery phrase collection. That September incident used a malicious verification file to collect secrets entered by users, while ethers-wallet-latest targets private keys supplied programmatically to a software library.
Both techniques use Telegram as a destination for sensitive data, but they involve different entry points. The shared communication method does not establish that the same attackers operated both campaigns.
The advisory does not identify applications that installed ethers-wallet-latest, the number of potentially exposed wallets or any resulting unauthorized cryptocurrency transfers. No independant victim count has been published.
Counterfeit Base58 packages intercept wallet decoding operations
Two additional GitHub advisories published November 17 identified malicious npm packages targeting Base58 encoding and decoding operations commonly used in cryptocurrency software.
The first concerns base128-x58, specifically versions 0.0.1 and 0.0.2. The package copies the legitimate base-x encoding library while retaining metadata pointing to the original cryptocoinjs/base-x repository.
Researchers found an obfuscated statement inserted at the beginning of its decode() function in both CommonJS and ECMAScript module implementations.
Every invocation of the compromised function attempts to transmit its input string to Telegram bot 8016635959, using chat ID -1002664926517.
Looks like a decoder; acts like a collection point.
Base58 encoding is used in cryptocurrency applications to represent addresses, keys and other binary data. When a wallet application passes a Base58-encoded private key to the malicious decoder, the original encoded input can be transmitted before the application completes its intended processing.
A seperate advisory identifies npm-bs58.js, a counterfeit package resembling the widely used bs58 library.
GitHub lists versions 1.0.0, 2.0.1, 2.0.2 and 6.0.0 as malicious. Earlier versions delegate encoding and decoding operations to base128-x58, while version 6.0.0 uses another malicious dependency, base64-x58.
The advisory associates those dependencies with Telegram bots 8016635959 and 8177895028, respectively. This establishes a direct dependency relationship between the counterfeit bs58 package and malicious decoding libraries.
Unlike an isolated malicious package that developers must install directly, a harmful dependency can reach an application through another package. A developer selecting npm-bs58.js could therefore introduce the malicious decoder without explicitly adding base128-x58 or base64-x58 to the project’s direct dependencies.
The available advisories confirm the malicious behavior of the affected packages but do not establish how many production applications installed or executed them.
November 18 advisory uncovers older base62 malware
A further advisory published November 18 identified malicious code in base62-85x version 5.0.4, expanding the documented set of counterfeit encoding packages associated with cryptocurrency credential theft.
According to the Open Source Security Foundation’s malware record MAL-2026-20109, the package imitates the base-x library and contains a hardcoded Telegram bot endpoint associated with other malicious encoding packages.
The endpoint references bot 7837266935, which also appears in the ethers-wallet-latest malware disclosure.
Researchers linked the package to base62-86x, another malicious encoding library whose decode() routine had been modified to transmit caller-supplied input strings to Telegram.
The older base62-86x malware record describes obfuscated collection routines in both CommonJS and ECMAScript module implementations, including different Telegram destinations in the two builds.
For base62-85x itself, the November 18 advisory establishes that the shipped code contained the malicious Telegram endpoint. It does not independently establish that the package executed a private-key transmission or that any wallet credentials were successfully stolen through this specific version.
That one is older, actually—months older.
According to the security record, base62-85x was originally published to npm on June 7, 2026, and unpublished on July 1. Its availabilty in the public registry therefore ended more than four months before the November 18 GitHub advisory.
The new disclosure documents a previously distributed threat rather than confirming a new malware release on November 18. Applications that installed the package while it was available could still require investigation if the dependency remained in their installed software or build artifacts.
The findings also follow the November 9 Ethersphere software supply-chain attack, which involved malicious releases of the bee-js npm package and Swarm Desktop application.
The Ethersphere case involved compromised legitimate publishing infrastructure. The newly documented encoding packages instead use counterfeit package names and malicious code embedded in libraries that imitate established software.
Shared Telegram infrastructure links packages, but losses remain unknown
The November 17 and 18 findings expose multiple technical connections among the malicious packages, although they do not establish that every package came from a single operator.
The clearest overlap involves ethers-wallet-latest, base60-58x, base62-85x and base62-86x, which share references to Telegram bot 7837266935. The separate base128-x58 and npm-bs58.js dependency chain involves other Telegram bots.
Same Telegram bot in this branch of the case, but not in all the packages.
The shared infrastructure supports an association among certain malware samples. It does not, by itself, establish the attackers’ identities, their total number of victims or whether the different Telegram bot clusters were managed together.
The attack methods also differ in when sensitive information becomes exposed. The counterfeit Ethereum wallet library targets private keys during wallet construction, while the malicious encoding libraries intercept data supplied to decoding functions.
Neither mechanism requires compromising the underlying Ethereum or Solana blockchain. The vulnerability exists in the software environment handling wallet credentials before those credentials are used to authorize transactions.
For developers, the relevent evidence includes installed package versions, dependency lockfiles, build records and whether the malicious functions actually processed private keys. Finding a malicious package in a dependency inventory establishes potential exposure, but it does not prove that a usable credential was transmitted.
Where private-key exposure is established or cannot reasonably be ruled out after execution of the affected code, removing the malicious dependency alone cannot invalidate a copied key. Affected wallets would need new, independently generated credentials, with remaining assets transferred from a trusted environment.
DaveFinances previously examined similar credential-exposure scenarios in its analysis of how malicious crypto browser extensions can leak private keys, including cases involving counterfeit applications and compromised legitimate software.
The newly disclosed npm findings provide another example of how malicious software can intercept credentials without directly attacking a blockchain network or exploiting a smart contract.
And no victim total, not yet.
As of November 18, the published advisories establish malicious code and identifiable exfiltration infrastructure, but not confirmed financial losses. Determining the actual impact will require installation evidence, execution records and, where available, transaction-level investigations linking exposed credentials to unauthorized wallet activity.
Johan Shamshad is Editor-in-Chief at Dave Finances, covering financial markets, digital assets, trading platforms, brokers, fintech, payments and regulation. Since 2023, he has also worked as an editor at Gulf News, the UAE English-language newspaper published by Al Nisr Publishing LLC. His work focuses on market-moving developments, company disclosures, regulatory changes and trading infrastructure, with an emphasis on primary-source verification and practical context for traders and investors.

