Wed. Nov 18th, 2026

Crypto roundup: B18 hack, Paytaca and Luxor hijack

ByJohan Shamshad

November 18, 2026 #crypto hack
Crypto Hack

B18TimeBank suffered an exploit involving approximately $404,540 in USDC on Base, Bitcoin Cash wallet provider Paytaca disclosed two consecutive attacks on its backend systems, and investigators traced the first outgoing transfer from Bitcoin mining rewards diverted during the Luxor Commander compromise. The latest crypto security roundup examines the confirmed transactions, the attack mechanisms and the financial exposure still being investigated.

Luxor mining hijacker sends first Bitcoin proceeds to HitBTC

Blockchain investigators have identified the first outgoing transfer from Bitcoin mining rewards associated with the November 15 Luxor Commander compromise, tracing 0.055 BTC, worth approximately $3,580, to an address attributed to cryptocurrency exchange HitBTC.

The November 17 finding builds on the previously reported Luxor mining hijack, in which attackers abused the company’s Commander fleet-management software to redirect customers’ computing power toward the OCEAN mining pool.

Luxor confirmed that just over a dozen client accounts were affected and said its engineers patched the compromised software within two hours. The company promised to compensate customers for the redirected hashrate and reported that its mining pool, LuxOS firmware and customer data were not compromised.

Early estimates suggested approximately 64,000 machines representing 13 exahashes per second had been redirected, although Luxor has not independently confirmed those figures.

According to blockchain investigation service PublicAML, the Bitcoin address identified by affected hosting operator CoreX recieved four OCEAN mining payouts between November 15 and 16, totaling 0.32445584 BTC, approximately $21,100 at the investigator’s reference price.

The payouts came from Bitcoin blocks 975995, 976029, 976084 and 976097, each contributing approximately 0.081 BTC. OCEAN’s subsequent blocks on November 17 no longer included the flagged address.

The machines were back, but the Bitcoin kept arriving.

PublicAML attributed the continued payments to OCEAN’s TIDES reward-distribution system, which allocates block rewards using previously submitted mining shares. Consequently, rewards could continue after the unauthorized computing power was disconnected.

At 10:42 UTC on November 17, the identified payout address spent its most recent mining reward through transaction records of the kind identified by the FBI as essential for tracing cryptocurrency theft.

The transaction directed 0.055 BTC to a deposit address attributed by PublicAML to HitBTC. At 11:03 UTC, approximately 21 minutes later, that amount was consolidated with 77 other inputs into a larger exchange-linked transaction totaling approximately 6.41 BTC.

Then came the first spend, and it was not for the whole balance.

Another 0.24308905 BTC remained at the original payout address, while 0.02607237 BTC was transferred to a seperate address identified as likely change. PublicAML reported that neither balance had moved at the time of its November 17 investigation.

The HitBTC attribution comes from the investigator’s address-labeling database. The blockchain confirms the transfers, but does not independently establish that the funds were sold, who controlled the receiving exchange account or whether the depositor was the original attacker.

Luxor has not disclosed the final compensation amount or published its promised technical post-mortem. The approximately $21,100 received by the flagged address is also not a verified measure of the full revenue lost by affected mining operators.

B18TimeBank loses $404,540 through reward-voucher exploit

Blockchain security firm Blockaid identified an exploit affecting B18TimeBank on November 17, reporting that an attacker redeemed signed level-reward vouchers before withdrawing approximately 404,540 USDC from the protocol’s settlement contract on Base.

The identified transaction occurred at 18:50:59 UTC, when address 0x28189EaeB578569E74FC1548b87440a384a51973 interacted with settlement contract 0x654520c9bAE2D8369043547bf0574C9F036CD054.

Transaction analysis identified a withdrawal of 404,540.468304 USDC through a contract call associated with the withdrawal of level rewards.

Blockaid disclosed the incident approximately one hour later, describing the attack as ongoing and identifying the exploiter, the settlement contract and the transaction involved.

A large amount left in one go, and that is about the firmest figure available.

A subsequent examination of the settlement contract found approximately 106,785 USDC remaining. The reported balance fell from approximately 511,326 USDC before the withdrawal to 106,785 USDC afterward, matching the recorded outflow.

Those balances establish the immediate movement of USDC but not the protocol’s final unrecovered loss, total customer exposure or whether other assets were affected.

The exploit involved signed reward vouchers, which are intended to authorize specific distributions from a smart contract. Blockaid’s findings indicate that vouchers were redeemed to obtain the withdrawn funds, but do not establish how the attacker acquired valid authorization or whether the signing process itself was compromised.

Without the underlying signing records, researchers cannot independantly establish whether the vulnerability involved voucher issuance, insufficient validation, unauthorized signing or another flaw in the redemption process.

The incident has some similarities to the October UNCX Network exploit, which Blockaid initially estimated at approximately $86,000 before additional research identified losses across several blockchains. That attack involved manipulation of shared vesting-pool accounting rather than B18TimeBank’s reported voucher-redemption mechanism.

There was still money in the contract, but that wasn’t a fix.

B18TimeBank has not published a confirmed total-loss assessment or a technical explanation identifying the underlying vulnerability. There has also been no verified announcement establishing that affected contracts were paused, the compromised authorization mechanism was disabled or withdrawn assets were recovered.

The confirmed figure therefore remains the approximately 404,540 USDC removed through the identified transaction, with the final impact and containment status unresolved.

Paytaca confirms two backend attacks in consecutive days

Bitcoin Cash wallet provider Paytaca disclosed on November 18 that attackers had exploited vulnerabilities in its backend infrastructure on two consecutive days, generating fraudulent peer-to-peer trading orders and unsolicited payment requests.

According to the company’s security advisory, the first incident occurred on November 17 and targeted its P2P Ramp backend, where attackers exploited a vulnerability to create fraudulent trading orders.

A second attack followed on November 18, exploiting a different backend vulnerability to generate payment requests that users had not initiated.

Paytaca said its security team had identified the incidents and was implementing fixes while continuing to investigate the affected systems.

The company stressed that customers’ private keys were not compromised. Paytaca operates a self-custodial Bitcoin Cash wallet, with the private keys required to authorize cryptocurrency transfers stored on users’ devices rather than its backend servers.

The requests appeared, but the wallets still needed a user to sign.

Although compromised backend infrastructure could generate unauthorized payment requests, Paytaca said actual transfers still required cryptographic signatures generated using customers’ private keys.

The company advised users to ignore suspicious P2P orders and unexpected payment requests, avoid approving transactions they did not initiate and never disclose their recovery phrases or private keys.

The incident differs from the recent Keplr wallet attack, in which compromised Web3Auth infrastructure exposed private-key material associated with certain social-login accounts. Investigators traced approximately $6 million in cryptocurrency across tens of thousands of affected wallets in that case.

For Paytaca, the reported compromise concerns backend functionality that creates trading instructions and payment requests, rather than confirmed access to users’ signing credentials.

That leaves an important limit on what the attackers could accomplish without further user interaction. An unsolicited request could be displayed to a customer, but the company’s disclosure does not establish that attackers could independently authorize transfers from self-custodied wallets.

Paytaca has not disclosed the number of fraudulent orders or payment requests generated, the number of customers affected or any confirmed financial losses. The company also has not identified the attackers or explained whether the two vulnerabilities originated from the same intial security weakness.

The three incidents leave different financial questions outstanding. Luxor’s compromised mining rewards have begun moving toward an exchange-linked address, although no liquidation has been confirmed. B18TimeBank has a documented USDC outflow without an established final loss or containment status. Paytaca has confirmed two backend compromises but has not reported a corresponding theft of customer funds.

Further verification will depend on Luxor’s technical post-mortem and compensation records, B18TimeBank’s contract-level investigation, and Paytaca’s assessment of unauthorized requests and any resulting customer transactions.

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Johan Shamshad is Editor-in-Chief at Dave Finances, covering financial markets, digital assets, trading platforms, brokers, fintech, payments and regulation. Since 2023, he has also worked as an editor at Gulf News, the UAE English-language newspaper published by Al Nisr Publishing LLC. His work focuses on market-moving developments, company disclosures, regulatory changes and trading infrastructure, with an emphasis on primary-source verification and practical context for traders and investors.

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