Cyber, the Layer 2 network formerly known as CyberConnect, is investigating an unexpected issuance of 5,213,000 CYBER tokens on Solana followed minutes later by a transfer of the same amount out of the token’s Ethereum bridge lockbox. South Korean exchanges Upbit and Bithumb suspended CYBER deposits and withdrawals on November 21, 2026, amid concerns about a potential bridge security incident.
Blockchain records cited in Upbit’s caution notice show the Solana mint at 11:13 a.m. Eastern Time and an Ethereum transfer from the CyberTokenAdapter contract approximately two minutes later. Investigators traced sales of much of the transferred CYBER into ether worth roughly $968,000 at the time. Cyber has not published a full root-cause analysis or confirmed a final loss figure.
One mint on Solana preceded an Ethereum lockbox withdrawal
In its November 21 incident statement, Cyber said it had seen unexpected CYBER minting on Solana and a subsequent movement from the Ethereum lockbox used by its bridge. It was examining which assets and bridging routes were affected. The project asked users not to use the bridge or deposit CYBER to exchanges while the checks continued.
The Ethereum transaction sent 5,213,000 CYBER to a newly funded address. On-chain analysts subsequently identified transfers between that address and another wallet, followed by repeated sales through decentralized swap routes involving KyberSwap and MetaMask Swaps. Most sales were carried out in batches of approximately 150,000 tokens, rather than as one giant exchange order.
By 12:40 p.m. Eastern Time, a wallet linked through those transactions had sent about 575.29 ETH to a new address, according to the transaction history reviewed by The Block. That amount was still at the receiving address when the initial report appeared. Another roughly 412,000 CYBER was sent to three addresses without established public ownership labels. Their presence does not establish that those recipients were additional attackers.
The mint and lockbox transfer are two movements across different chains. Their matching token quantities are central to the suspicion that a cross-chain validation or accounting process was misused, but neither the project nor an independent post-mortem has established the exact security failure. It would be premature to attribute the issue to LayerZero code, a compromised private key, or a validator without further evidence.
Upbit and Bithumb halted transfers, not spot trading
The Korean exchanges reacted by disabling deposits and withdrawals for CYBER, a restriction designed to prevent uncertain token flows into their custody systems while the incident is reviewed. Upbit also issued a trading-caution notice. Bithumb said CYBER trading itself would remain available during the transfer suspension, and the available announcements do not establish a full exchange delisting.
This distinction affects holders. A customer may still be able to trade a balance already held inside an exchange even while movement of the token to or from an external wallet is blocked. An open order book does not imply that blockchain deposits are being credited normally. DaveFinances previously documented similar transfer restrictions involving KAVA at three Korean exchanges, where continued trading did not mean the related security questions were resolved.
CYBER fell roughly 8% to $0.2024 during the selling described in the initial investigation, then recovered to around $0.213 at that publication’s snapshot. Those are historical intraday observations, not a verified current quotation. The approximate $968,000 in observed swap proceeds also should not be treated as the market value of every CYBER token issued or transferred during the incident.
The bridge warning leaves its root cause unresolved
Cyber’s official advice was specific: users should not attempt token migrations, connect wallets to a purported repair portal or sign new transactions to secure holdings. The project said none of those steps was required. That matters because fraudulent recovery instructions can circulate around genuine bridge disruptions, making users vulnerable to a seperate wallet-draining attack.
Cyber’s token infrastructure spans multiple chains, and the bridge’s Ethereum lockbox holds tokens intended to support cross-chain movements. If a destination chain can recognize a supply increase that is not properly authorized, or if an origin contract can release collateral without a legitimate counterpart, the accounting between the chains may become unreliable. This explains the risk; it is not a diagnosis of what specifically failed here.
An earlier DaveFinances investigation of Ankr’s bridge incident documented forged cross-chain receipts leading to unauthorized withdrawals. That attack offers a different example of an origin-versus-destination verification problem, but no technical evidence yet links its method to the CYBER movements.
There is another legal comparison in DaveFinances’ coverage of KelpDAO’s litigation over a LayerZero-connected exploit. Cyber’s bridge also uses LayerZero infrastructure, but the existence of that relationship does not show that LayerZero was responsible for the November 21 incident. The investigation must identify the component and conditions involved before responsibility can be assessed.
Next steps hinge on token accounting and exchange clearance
Cyber launched its social-focused Ethereum Layer 2 in 2024 after rebranding from CyberConnect. Its CYBER token had previously been distributed through Binance Launchpool, and the project recently said it had repurchased about $13 million in CYBER over the preceding year. Those figures are business background, not evidence that the buybacks played a role in the security event.
To clarify the damage, the project needs to reconcile token supply on Solana against collateral held on Ethereum, determine whether any unauthorized tokens remain in circulation and explain which bridge paths can safely be used. Exchange operators separately need to establish when inbound transfers can be credited again without exposing customers to disputed balances.
Until Cyber publishes those findings, the verifed facts are an unexpected 5.213 million-token mint, a matching Ethereum lockbox withdrawal, and a chain of subsequent token sales. Recovery or compensation terms have not been confirmed, and holders should treat any claim of an urgent migration as unverified. The route is under investigation, not declared repaired.
Johan Shamshad is Editor-in-Chief at Dave Finances, covering financial markets, digital assets, trading platforms, brokers, fintech, payments and regulation. Since 2023, he has also worked as an editor at Gulf News, the UAE English-language newspaper published by Al Nisr Publishing LLC. His work focuses on market-moving developments, company disclosures, regulatory changes and trading infrastructure, with an emphasis on primary-source verification and practical context for traders and investors.

