Sat. Nov 21st, 2026

Crypto hack roundup: Chainflip, Ledger, Fluidkey, XMR1

ByJohan Shamshad

November 21, 2026
HackHack

Four cryptocurrency security developments are drawing attention on November 21, 2026, involving a suspected $4.86 million Chainflip vault exploit, Arkham’s reconstruction of the $95.35 million CryptoBilis-Ledger theft, Fluidkey’s explanation of a $1.58 million wallet drain, and Wagyu’s response to a $13.5 million XMR1 sell-off. Today’s crypto hack roundup covers new on-chain findings, compromised infrastructure, service suspensions and unresolved questions about stolen funds and customer reimbursement.

Chainflip halts operations after $4.86 million Ethereum vault drain

Cross-chain swapping protocol Chainflip suspended deposits, withdrawals, swaps and price quotes on November 21 after security researchers identified approximately $4.86 million leaving its Ethereum vault in a single transaction.

The suspicious transaction occurred at 07:10:59 UTC, transferring 520.2 ETH, approximately 3.25 million USDC and 758,141 USDT to an external address. Blockchain investigators Defimon Alerts and Onchain Lens identified the outflow, while AMLBot traced subsequent conversions and movements involving Tornado Cash.

Chainflip acknowledged a potential exploit affecting its vaults at approximately 09:14 UTC and announced that the network was entering full safe mode while its team investigated.

According to the blockchain findings, the withdrawal carried a valid signature associated with the vault’s aggregate signing key. Researchers suggested that the signing credentials might have been compromised, although Chainflip has not established that as the cause.

The signature was valid, but how the attacker obtained it, that remains unclear.

Chainflip’s architecture relies on validators jointly authorizing vault transactions through a threshold-signature mechanism. A valid aggregate signature demonstrates that a transaction satisfied the vault’s cryptographic authorization requirements, not necessarily that the underlying transfer was legitimate.

Security researchers also reported that the attacker converted the withdrawn stablecoins into ETH and subsequently routed approximately 2,909 ETH, valued at around $4.75 million, through transactions involving Tornado Cash.

The protocol’s full safe mode prevents normal swap payouts and liquidity-provider withdrawals. Deposits awaiting final processing may also remain pending until the network resumes operation.

Chainflip previously suffered a separate exploit on September 12, when attackers extracted 736,442.17 USDT from its Tron vault by manipulating withdrawal and refund processing. The team subsequently introduced changes to how Tron transaction instructions were interpreted.

The November incident involves Ethereum vault authorization rather than the previously identified Tron refund vulnerability. Available evidence does not establish a connection between the two.

Chainflip has also appeared in investigations involving stolen cryptocurrency moving through cross-chain services. In September, a broker rejected a Bitget-linked deposit through Chainflip, returning funds associated with an earlier exchange breach. That rejection occurred at the broker level and was unrelated to the current vault incident.

The latest investigaton has yet to establish whether the Ethereum transaction resulted from compromised signing credentials, unauthorized validator activity or another failure in transaction authorization. Chainflip has not confirmed its final financial loss or announced a timetable for restoring services.

Arkham traces $58.74 million from CryptoBilis theft to Tornado Cash

Blockchain intelligence company Arkham published a new reconstruction of the CryptoBilis-Ledger wallet thefts on November 21, tracing approximately $95.35 million in cryptocurrency stolen from 1,486 reported Ledger user addresses between October 7 and October 9.

The investigation attributes the thefts to compromised hardware wallets distributed through CryptoBilis, an authorized Ledger reseller. Ledger previously confirmed that an examined device associated with the incident contained an unauthorized hardware implant.

Arkham’s updated findings identify 25,017.31 ETH, valued at approximately $58.74 million, transferred into Tornado Cash through multiple transactions.

Of that amount, 18,502.31 ETH, valued at approximately $44.43 million in Arkham’s reconstruction, originated from ETH holdings associated with the drainer’s wallets. Another 6,515 ETH, worth approximately $14.31 million, resulted from Bitcoin conversions through THORChain.

The transfers occured across several weeks, rather than representing a new laundering operation on November 21. Arkham places the direct ETH deposits between October 9 and November 10, while the ETH acquired through THORChain was deposited between November 6 and November 10.

And the money took different routes before it reached the mixer.

Arkham also identified approximately $10 million in USDT remaining frozen across 20 Tron addresses. According to the investigation, Tether blacklisted those addresses on October 9, preventing the identified balances from being transferred normally.

The frozen assets represent approximately 10.5% of Arkham’s estimated $95.35 million theft total. Their immobilization does not establish that the funds have been returned to victims.

Earlier research produced different loss estimates. In October, Bitquery estimated CryptoBilis-linked losses at $102 million across 324 wallets on six blockchains. Arkham’s latest reconstruction uses a different address count and estimates $95.35 million. The available reporting does not establish that the investigators used identical wallet classifications or valuation methodologies.

There is also a regulatory context to the reported Tornado Cash movements. The U.S. Treasury removed economic sanctions against Tornado Cash in March 2025, while maintaining its commitment to pursuing illicit cryptocurrency activity. The removal did not eliminate the potential for criminal investigations into stolen assets passing through mixing services.

Arkham’s findings provide a more detailed account of how the stolen assets were converted and transferred. They do not identify the individuals controlling the alleged attacker wallets or establish how much cryptocurrency investigators or victims may ultimately recover.

Fluidkey blames third-party logging tool for $1.58 million theft

Privacy-focused cryptocurrency wallet Fluidkey has attributed its November 19 security breach to vulnerabilities involving a third-party logging tool, providing a prelimnary explanation for an attack that blockchain investigators estimate resulted in at least $1.58 million in stolen assets.

According to Fluidkey’s November 20 update, the attackers exploited weaknesses in the external logging system to obtain session data and prepare unauthorized transfers on the company’s servers.

Those transactions were subsequently presented for signing when affected users opened the Fluidkey application. The company maintains that users’ private keys remained on their own devices throughout the incident.

The keys stayed on the devices, according to Fluidkey, yet transactions still went through.

Fluidkey’s explanation identifies an attack involving the transaction-preparation process rather than a confirmed compromise of private-key storage.

Blockchain analytics company Bitquery independently traced at least $1.58 million reaching attacker-linked wallets across six networks between 17:28 and 18:04 UTC on November 19.

The investigation identified unusually high transaction activity through Fluidkey’s relayer infrastructure. On Ethereum and Base, Bitquery counted 174 transactions during the relevant hour, compared with fewer than 30 per hour during the preceding observation period.

Approximately half of the attacker-linked funds had already been transferred within the first five minutes of the drain.

Bitquery also identified 881.6 ETH, worth approximately $1.57 million at the prices used in its investigation, deposited into Tornado Cash from six wallets between 20:05 and 21:29 UTC on November 19.

The researcher distinguished attacker-linked payouts from apparent legitimate customer transfers. Another approximately $65,000 went to addresses whose ownership could not be confidently classified, placing the potential total above the confirmed $1.58 million estimate.

Fluidkey suspended its services during the attack and subsequently restored its web, iOS and Android applications with version 1.79.22. Older versions remain blocked, requiring users to update before resuming transactions.

The company said the updated application prevents transfers from being prepared through the mechanism identified in its investigation. It has not publicly identified the logging provider or released a complete independent forensic report.

No confirmed compensation arrangement has been announced, and the number of users suffering financial losses remains undisclosed.

Wagyu links $13.5 million XMR1 sell-off to hosting breach

Wagyu’s pseudonymous operator, PerpetualCow, has blamed an alleged compromise of Icelandic hosting provider 1984.hosting for the exposure of credentials controlling the XMR1 token, following a sell-off that generated approximately $13.5 million and caused the wrapped-Monero asset to lose more than 99% of its market value.

The incident occurred on November 20, when approximately 5.2 million XMR1 tokens moved from the token’s deployer account to another wallet.

Blockchain researchers subsequently identified sales on Hyperliquid that generated approximately $13.5 million in USDC. The proceeds were converted into ETH and moved through Ethereum and Arbitrum addresses.

XMR1 fell from approximately $500 to around $1 during the sell-off. The token represents Monero through Wagyu’s wrapping and redemption service and should not be confused with native XMR.

In his post-mortem, PerpetualCow claimed that the XMR1 deployer key had been stored on an old server rented from 1984.hosting. Although the server had reportedly been deleted, he alleged that files or logs containing sensitive information remained accessible through the provider’s infrastructure.

The operator connected the suspected exposure to a cybersecurity incident affecting the hosting company.

Icelandic reporting separately confirmed that 1984 experienced a serious cyberattack and temporarily suspended services while investigating the intrusion with relevant cybersecurity authorities. That confirmation does not independently establish that the attackers obtained Wagyu’s signing key from retained server files.

PerpetualCow promised to personally reimburse affected XMR1 holders and said Wagyu would relaunch after the incident was addressed.

The reimbursment promise is public, but actual payments have yet to be independently confirmed.

The operator has not disclosed a complete compensation timetable, verified customer-loss total or detailed methodology for determining eligible claims. The reported $13.5 million in token sales represents proceeds from the suspicious trading activity, not a verified calculation of the financial losses suffered by individual holders.

Wagyu had previously appeared in an unrelated cryptocurrency investigation. Earlier in November, ZachXBT traced suspected theft proceeds from a European entity through several cryptocurrency services, including Monero conversions associated with Wagyu. That earlier investigation did not establish misconduct by Wagyu or a connection to the latest incident.

The four developments involve seperate security failures and investigations, with different levels of confirmation. Chainflip has suspended operations while examining an apparently authorized vault withdrawal, Fluidkey has restored services after describing a server-side transaction manipulation, and Wagyu has pledged refunds while the reported source of its key exposure remains unverified.

Arkham’s CryptoBilis reconstruction, meanwhile, documents historical movement of stolen assets and a $10 million freeze rather than a fresh theft. Across the incidents, blockchain records establish substantial transfers, but final losses, technical attribution and recoveries still depend on evidence that the affected operators and investigators have not fully published.

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Johan Shamshad is Editor-in-Chief at Dave Finances, covering financial markets, digital assets, trading platforms, brokers, fintech, payments and regulation. Since 2023, he has also worked as an editor at Gulf News, the UAE English-language newspaper published by Al Nisr Publishing LLC. His work focuses on market-moving developments, company disclosures, regulatory changes and trading infrastructure, with an emphasis on primary-source verification and practical context for traders and investors.

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