Cryptocurrency security incidents dominated November 20 and 21, with a suspected deployer-key compromise triggering $13.51 million in XMR1 purchases from an attacker on Hyperliquid, while privacy-wallet provider Fluidkey disclosed how unauthorized transactions drained at least $1.58 million across six blockchains. Today’s crypto roundup also covers another Osmosis network outage that forced South Korean exchange Bithumb to suspend transfers, and a newly disclosed high-severity vulnerability in Bitcoin Lightning wallet software LNbits that could expose authenticated users to malicious QR codes. The incidents involve different security failures, from compromised infrastructure and transaction authorization to blockchain reliability and browser-based wallet attacks.
Wagyu-linked XMR1 exploit leaves Hyperliquid buyers exposed to $13.51 million
A suspected compromise of Wagyu’s XMR1 deployer account triggered a collapse in the Monero-linked token on Hyperliquid on November 20, after an attacker-controlled account received 5.2 million XMR1 and began selling the assets into the exchange’s spot market.
Blockchain analytics firm Bitquery traced the unauthorized transfers to the account responsible for deploying XMR1, a token issued through Wagyu’s infrastructure to represent Monero on Hyperliquid. The token had traded near $500 before losing approximately 99.8% of its market value within roughly half an hour, falling to around $1.
According to Bitquery’s transaction-level investigation, the deployer sent 100,000 XMR1 at 04:46 UTC, another 100,000 at 05:14 UTC and 5 million at 05:16 UTC to an account created earlier that morning.
Three transfers, and the last one was enormous: five million tokens in a single movement.
Between 04:49 and 10:28 UTC, the attacker sold approximately 369,623 XMR1 to 420 buyers, collecting $13.51 million. Roughly 75% of the proceeds came from buy orders already resting on Hyperliquid’s order book, rather than orders submitted after the sell-off began.
The $13.51 million represents the gross amount paid to the attacker, not a verified calculation of every buyer’s final net loss. Some counterparties may have subsequently traded or retained tokens, while the available records do not establish their recoveries.
Bitquery traced the proceeds from Hyperliquid through Arbitrum, where the attacker converted the funds into Ethereum before bridging substantial balances to Ethereum mainnet. At the investigation’s November 20 cutoff, approximately 7,348 ETH remained in three wallets associated with the attacker.
Wagyu operator PerpetualCow attributed the incident to a compromise of Icelandic hosting provider 1984.hosting. According to his account, the hosting provider retained files from a previously deleted server containing the deployer key, which attackers allegedly obtained during a wider intrusion.
The hosting provider’s cyberattack was reported seperately in Iceland. The company and Iceland’s national computer security incident response team, CERT-IS, acknowledged a serious infrastructure breach, while the provider temporarily suspended services.
The host was attacked, yes, but the route from that breach to Wagyu’s deployer key is still based on the operator’s account.
On-chain records establish that the deployer account transferred tokens to the attacker-controlled account. They cannot establish how the credentials were obtained or independently confirm that the hosting incident caused the unauthorized transfers.
PerpetualCow promised to reimburse affected users, including market makers who absorbed losses during the sell-off. Bitquery found no evidence of reimbursements to the ten largest buyers at its November 20 observation cutoff, although later payments cannot be ruled out.
The investigation identified another potential exposure involving ZEC1, a token representing Zcash through the same infrastructure. According to Bitquery, the deployer account associated with the XMR1 incident still controlled approximately 99.97% of ZEC1’s supply. The finding identifies concentrated token control but does not establish that ZEC1 was stolen, sold or subjected to a second attack.
XMR1 had appeared in other cryptocurrency security investigations before the latest collapse. DaveFinances previously documented attacker-linked transfers into XMR1 on Hyperliquid following an unrelated website compromise involving Across Protocol. Bitquery traced approximately $100,000 through Arbitrum into the token in that case, illustrating its previous use in cross-chain fund movements without establishing any connection between the attackers.
The outstanding questions for Wagyu concern the compromised credentials, the remaining backing for its issued tokens and the promised reimbursements. The available disclosures have not established how much Monero remains available to redeem the outstanding XMR1 supply.
Fluidkey restores wallet services after $1.58 million drain
Privacy-focused cryptocurrency wallet Fluidkey restored its web, iOS and Android applications on November 20 after disclosing a technical explanation for unauthorized transfers that affected users across six blockchains the previous day.
The company announced that services were back online with version 1.79.22, following a shutdown initiated during the November 19 security incident. Older application versions were prevented from resuming normal operations.
Fluidkey attributed the breach to a third-party logging tool that allegedly exposed user-session information. According to the company, attackers used that information to prepare unauthorized transactions on Fluidkey’s servers and arrange for those transactions to be signed when users opened the wallet application.
The company maintains that users’ private keys never left their devices.
That account describes a failure in the transaction-authorization process rather than a confirmed theft of the underlying private keys. The transactions were allegedly prepared through compromised session data and obtained signatures when customers interacted with the application.
Bitquery independently traced at least $1.58 million to attacker-linked wallets across Ethereum, Base, BNB Chain, Optimism, Arbitrum and Polygon. The unauthorized transfers occurred during a 36-minute period between 17:28 and 18:04 UTC on November 19.
The money moved quickly, with approximately half the traced proceeds reaching the attacker during the first five minutes.
Fluidkey’s relayer infrastructure, which submits transactions and pays network fees on users’ behalf, processed the unauthorized transfers. Bitquery identified 174 relayer transactions across Ethereum and Base during the 17:00 UTC hour, compared with no more than 30 per hour during the preceding observation periods.
Not every transfer processed during the incident was malicious. Investigators also identified approximately $349,000 moving to wallets with established transaction histories, including funds apparently withdrawn by legitimate customers.
The attackers subsequently converted stolen assets into Ethereum. Bitquery traced approximately 881.6 ETH, valued at roughly $1.57 million, entering Tornado Cash from six wallets between 20:05 and 21:29 UTC on November 19.
Those deposits obscure subsequent transaction links, complicating attempts to determine where the proceeds moved afterward. The investigation does not establish that those funds have been recovered.
Security firm Coinspect separately examined Fluidkey’s updated frontend and identified new EIP-712 transaction-bound approval mechanisms. Those changes are consistent with Fluidkey’s explanation that authorization controls were inadequate during the attack, although Coinspect could not independently verify the claimed logging-tool compromise.
The restored application appears designed to tie signatures more closely to specific transaction details rather than accepting the previous authorization process. It is a relevant technical change because the attack reportedly relied on users signing transactions they had not intentionally prepared.
The service was back, but the updated application was the only version allowed to operate.
Fluidkey’s incident also resembles an earlier class of third-party infrastructure failures examined by DaveFinances in its reporting on Predict.fun wallet losses and compromised Udesk scripts. That investigation covered approximately $398,000 in unauthorized wallet transfers alongside malicious JavaScript capable of collecting session information and manipulating cryptocurrency deposit addresses. The incidents are unrelated, and their specific attack mechanisms differ.
Fluidkey has provided a technical explanation and restored its applications, but the available information does not independently establish how the third-party tool was compromised, how many customers were affected or whether all stolen funds can be reimbursed. Approximately $1.58 million had been recieved by attacker-linked wallets according to Bitquery’s November 20 investigation.
Bithumb suspends OSMO deposits and withdrawals after network outage
South Korean cryptocurrency exchange Bithumb announced another suspension of Osmosis (OSMO) deposits and withdrawals on November 21, following a blockchain outage that interrupted transaction processing for more than three hours.
The exchange published its Korean-language notice at 02:50 KST, corresponding to 17:50 UTC on November 20. Bithumb attributed the suspension to the Osmosis network stopping block production, leaving the exchange unable to process normal OSMO transfers.
Trading remained available during the restriction, although customers were warned that deposits and withdrawals would not be processed normally until the network was stable.
Independent monitoring by blockchain infrastructure provider QuickNode confirmed that Osmosis Mainnet stalled at block 75,653,279 at approximately 17:36 UTC on November 20.
QuickNode subsequently marked the incident resolved at 20:52 UTC, establishing an interruption of approximately three hours and sixteen minutes. Its status reporting documented recovery of block production, rather than confirmation that every exchange had resumed customer transfers.
Blocks started moving again, but Bithumb still had its own transfer service to bring back.
The timing also overlapped with a scheduled Osmosis mainnet infrastructure upgrade window recorded on QuickNode’s status page, involving version 32.0.1. The available incident notices do not establish whether that upgrade caused the interruption.
The latest outage follows an earlier Osmosis block-production problem on November 12–13, which also led Bithumb to restrict deposits and withdrawals. The exchange later announced that services associated with the earlier incident would resume on November 16 at 13:00 KST.
The November 21 notice therefore concerns a new interruption, not a continuation of the earlier suspension. Bithumb said deposits and withdrawals would resume after network stability had been secured, but it did not specify a reopening time in the reviewed announcement.
Similar exchange-level restrictions have affected other Cosmos-related networks. In September, DaveFinances documented Kraken funding incidents involving Osmosis and other Cosmos-linked blockchains, where deposits or withdrawals were restricted while other exchange services continued operating. Those incidents were seperate and do not establish a shared technical cause with the November Osmosis outage.
The latest block-production stoppage confirms a temporary failure of network availability. It does not establish that Osmosis suffered a theft, that transactions were permanently lost or that Bithumb’s custody infrastructure was compromised.
For customers waiting on OSMO transfers, the relevant operational event is Bithumb’s confirmation that deposit and withdrawal processing has resumed, rather than the network’s recovery notice alone.
LNbits vulnerability exposes Lightning wallet sessions to malicious QR codes
A high-severity security advisory published November 20 identified a reflected cross-site scripting vulnerability in LNbits, open-source software used to operate Bitcoin Lightning wallets and payment services.
The vulnerability, designated CVE-2026-118671 and assigned a CVSS severity score of 8.1, affects the software’s /lnurlwallet endpoint, according to the official LNbits GitHub security advisory.
The affected endpoint handles LNURL withdrawal requests, including QR codes commonly used to claim small Bitcoin payments through the Lightning Network.
According to the disclosure, an attacker can construct a malicious LNURL link containing specially prepared data that causes the application to place untrusted text into an HTML error response without adequate escaping.
If a user opens that link or scans the corresponding QR code, the injected JavaScript can execute within the LNbits application’s own web origin.
A legitimate-looking claim code could therefore carry executable code, with the browser treating it as part of the wallet application.
Where the victim already has an authenticated LNbits session, the injected script could use that session to access wallet balances, inspect payment history, create API keys or initiate other actions permitted to the logged-in user.
The exploit does not require the attacker to know the user’s password or obtain the wallet’s underlying private keys. It relies on the browser processing attacker-controlled content within a trusted application context.
The published advisory identifies versions up to and including 1.6.2-rc1 as affected. No patched version was listed in the advisory as reviewed on November 21.
The issue is classified as CWE-79, involving improper neutralization of input during webpage generation. The advisory includes a proof of concept demonstrating that a specially prepared request can inject executable JavaScript into the resulting page.
The disclosed reproduction demonstrates technical exploitability but is not evidence that attackers have used the vulnerability to steal Bitcoin from production wallets. No verified loss amount or affected-user count accompanies the advisory.
For administrators operating publicly accessible LNbits instances, exposure depends on the installed software version, whether the affected endpoint is reachable and the privileges associated with authenticated sessions. User interaction remains a prerequisite under the published attack scenario.
The advisory’s missing patched-version entry leaves administrators without a confirmed fixed release from that particular disclosure. Operators need to check subsequent project security updates and apply appropriate access restrictions or other mitigations until a verified correction is availble.
The four developments show different unresolved operational conditions. Wagyu has promised compensation without verified repayment completion, Fluidkey has restored services following a documented multi-chain drain, and Bithumb’s reopening of OSMO transfers requires exchange-level confirmation. LNbits presents a separate preventive security issue: a publicly documented vulnerability with a working proof of concept and no patched version identified in the November 20 advisory.
Johan Shamshad is Editor-in-Chief at Dave Finances, covering financial markets, digital assets, trading platforms, brokers, fintech, payments and regulation. Since 2023, he has also worked as an editor at Gulf News, the UAE English-language newspaper published by Al Nisr Publishing LLC. His work focuses on market-moving developments, company disclosures, regulatory changes and trading infrastructure, with an emphasis on primary-source verification and practical context for traders and investors.

