Sun. Nov 22nd, 2026

Chainflip confirms 122.86 BTC theft, offers 10% bounty

ByJohan Shamshad

November 22, 2026
HackHack

Chainflip Labs has confirmed that the November 21 attack on its cross-chain swap network took 122.86137042 bitcoin in addition to approximately $4.86 million in ether and dollar-pegged tokens initially identified leaving an Ethereum vault. The broader loss is now valued at roughly $12 million at prices around the incident, substantially above the first reports that focused on Ethereum alone.

The company offered the attacker a 10% bounty for returning the remaining 90% by November 23 at 18:38 UTC, saying it had identified how its signing key was exposed and acted to prevent a repeat. Chainflip has not published a full technical post-mortem or confirmed any recovery. The network entered full safe mode after the exploit, disabling deposits, withdrawals, swaps and price quotations.

Official message adds 122.86 BTC to earlier Ethereum loss

Chainflip’s public message addressed to the attacker identifies the four stolen assets as 122.86137042 BTC, 520.2243399 ETH, 3,249,631.41 USDC and 758,141.33 USDT. An initial investigation on Saturday had accounted for the Ethereum-side outflows but not the additional bitcoin. The company’s own statement is the basis for expanding the incident estimate.

Chainflip asked for 110.57523337 BTC and 2,618.1 ETH to be transferred to designated recovery addresses. The ETH demand reflects recovery of the converted proceeds rather than a request to return each stablecoin in its original form. If both transfers arrive before the deadline, Chainflip said it would treat the episode as a white-hat recovery and withdraw complaints to law-enforcement agencies.

That is an offer, not proof the attacker has agreed. The company also claims it traced preparatory activity to Tornado Cash funding on November 11, a FLIP token purchase, a validator account registered on November 20 and associated server information. It says investigators and law enforcement could use metadata to identify the responsible party, but it has not named a suspect or published evidence sufficient to confirm an identity.

DaveFinances’ November 21 security roundup covered the first $4.86 million Ethereum vault report, before the public confirmation of the bitcoin loss and bounty offer. The new disclosure changes the size of the incident, not merely its valuation. The initial amount remains correct as a measure of Ethereum outflows, but no longer represents the full known theft.

One valid signature emptied the Ethereum vault

On-chain investigators identified a transaction at 07:10:59 UTC on November 21 that transferred the Ethereum vault’s entire liquid balance: 520.22 ETH, about 3.25 million USDC and 758,141 USDT. The call carried a signature accepted by Chainflip’s key management contract. That matters because the contract executed an apparently authorized withdrawal without rejecting the payload.

Chainflip uses a threshold-signature system in which up to 150 validators participate, with at least 100 normally required to construct a valid aggregate signature. A valid signature does not demonstrate that 100 validators knowingly approved an unauthorized transaction; nor does it establish whether private-key material was stolen or a weakness in the signing process allowed unauthorized use.

Bitquery examined 299,677 accepted signatures since 2023 and found the malicious transfer was the only one whose nonce departed from the usual incrementing sequence. The submitted 39-digit nonce contrasted with a counter near 315,000 on normal operations. That anomaly suggests the signature may have been produced outside the regular withdrawal workflow, although the chain alone cannot identify how it was generated.

The network rotated its Ethereum signing key about one hour and 42 minutes later, earlier than the scheduled rotation. Researchers viewed that timing as a containment indicator, but timing itself cannot prove why validators switched keys. Chainflip now says it identified the key-exposure mechanism and blocked a recurrence, without yet publishing the underlying forensic explanaton.

Stablecoins were converted before issuers could intervene

The Ethereum attack unfolded rapidly. According to Bitquery’s transaction reconstruction, the attacker converted USDC and USDT into ether through decentralized swaps within minutes, then sent approximately 2,909 ETH into Tornado Cash by 07:19 UTC. It was a matter of minutes, not days. The firm traced 38 mixer deposits in under a minute.

Centralized stablecoins can be blocked at the issuer contract level, but that control does not directly extend to native ether after a token has been swapped. Security investigators said the conversion happened too quickly for Circle or Tether to stop the specific transfers. The public record does not establish whether the issuers received requests, or precisely when any alerts reached them.

The FLIP token fell roughly 34% in the immediate aftermath according to market data cited by The Block, with a contemporaneous market-capitalization decline from about $41.6 million to $27.1 million. Those are snapshots at the time of the first report, not live prices, and the percentage change should not be conflated with the amount drained from the vaults.

The full safe-mode announcement blocks swaps, deposits, withdrawals and quotes. A customer who submitted a cross-chain transaction before the halt may have to wait for the team to clarify settlement and withdrawal procedures. Chainflip has not stated when regular operatons will resume or committed publicly to reimburse victims of the November breach.

Second major breach follows September Tron reimbursement

Chainflip had already sustained a separate Tron USDT exploit on September 12, when a flaw involving processing transaction memos allowed repeated withdrawals and cost approximately $736,000. Validators later approved a plan to reimburse affected liquidity providers using accumulated protocol surplus. The September incident and November signature-related attack are different in mechanism, assets and reported scale.

Another point of historical context is Chainflip’s role in other protocols’ cross-chain routes. DaveFinances previously reported that Symbiosis restored certain swap routes using Chainflip and THORChain after a distinct bridge incident. That prior integration does not show that Symbiosis assets were affected by this attack, but it illustrates how a service halt can interrupt dependent trading routes.

Chainflip has also appeared in investigations as a venue handling cross-chain movements, including a DaveFinances report on a rejected Bitget-linked deposit. The November event raises a separate security question about protecting the network’s own aggregated signing authority rather than merely screening assets that outside users attempt to swap.

For liquidity providers and swap customers, there are still two unresolved matters: whether stolen assets can be recovered before the bounty deadline, and when services and withdrawal access can safely resume. The company’s latest account includes a larger bitcoin loss and a claim of remedial action, but neither a verified recovery tally nor a full post-mortem is yet availble. That is the boundary between the confirmed theft and the remaining investigation.

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Johan Shamshad is Editor-in-Chief at Dave Finances, covering financial markets, digital assets, trading platforms, brokers, fintech, payments and regulation. Since 2023, he has also worked as an editor at Gulf News, the UAE English-language newspaper published by Al Nisr Publishing LLC. His work focuses on market-moving developments, company disclosures, regulatory changes and trading infrastructure, with an emphasis on primary-source verification and practical context for traders and investors.

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