Wed. Nov 18th, 2026

Curve Finance loses $38,206 in fee contract exploit

ByJohan Shamshad

November 18, 2026 #Curve Finance

Curve Finance has disclosed that an attacker stole $38,205.76 in DAO fee revenue through 138 unauthorized transactions on November 10, exploiting a signature-validation flaw in its Ethereum CowSwapBurner contract. The decentralized finance protocol published its detailed security report on November 17, confirming that the stolen assets have not been recovered.

The attack targeted accumulated protocol fees rather than customer deposits. Curve said its liquidity pools, lending markets and crvUSD stablecoin were unaffected. Its regular weekly fee conversion also completed successfully, generating 97,317.74 crvUSD for the DAO.

The vulnerability allowed an attacker to reuse the signature data from a legitimate CoW Protocol order while submitting entirely different trades that transferred assets to an attacker-controlled wallet.

A separate investigation by blockchain analytics firm Bitquery has since identified an apparently identical vulnerability exploited against Balancer’s fee burner on October 24, approximately 17 days before Curve’s loss. Bitquery estimates that the earlier incident involved 26 unauthorized trades worth about $1,512.

Attacker executes 138 unauthorized orders in 11 hours

Curve’s CowSwapBurner, deployed on Ethereum in June 2024, converts fees collected from the protocol’s pools and markets into crvUSD for distribution through its DAO fee system.

The contract receives accumulated tokens on Mondays and opens a 24-hour exchange window at 00:00 UTC every Tuesday. It submits orders through CoW Protocol, normally requiring proceeds of at least 500 crvUSD per sale and directing settlement to Curve’s FeeCollector contract.

On November 10, the attacker submitted the first fraudulent order at 00:07 UTC, seven minutes after the exchange window opened. The transaction sold the burner’s YB token balance for USDC, directing the proceeds to an external wallet rather than Curve’s FeeCollector.

The attacker then reused the same legitimate order data to authorize another 137 fraudulent transactions covering different tokens.

Most of the theft happened quickly, very quickly. By 00:24 UTC, 133 fraudulent orders had settled, with another five completed over the following hours. The final unauthorized trade occurred at 11:10 UTC.

Curve’s investigation identified 138 forged orders involving 135 tokens, producing exactly 38,205.76 USDC for the attacker. The median fraudulent transaction was worth approximately $254, and only two exceeded $500.

Most of the stolen assets were small balances that had remained unsold because they failed to meet the burner’s minimum conversion threshold. Among tokens previously sold through the system, the median period since the last sale was 161 days.

These balances had accumlated over time, separate from the assets processed during the regular weekly conversion. The attacker’s orders did not overlap with the 36 legitimate orders that delivered 97,317.74 crvUSD to Curve’s FeeCollector.

Curve reviewed all 6,558 orders settled through the burner since deployment and identified the 138 fraudulent transactions as the only ones whose proceeds were not delivered to the designated collector. Before the incident, the contract had completed 6,420 legitimate orders and delivered approximately 20.5 million crvUSD.

Signature-validation flaw allowed fraudulent trades

The exploit originated in the burner’s implementation of ERC-1271, a standard allowing smart contracts to validate signatures associated with transactions and other authorized actions.

Under the official ERC-1271 signature-validation standard, a contract receives a message hash and signature data through its isValidSignature function. The contract determines whether the submitted signature is valid for the corresponding hash.

Curve’s implementation checked whether the order described inside the supplied signature data met its normal requirements, including the designated receiver and minimum crvUSD proceeds. It did not verify that this description matched the actual order being executed.

The implementation explicitly ignored the order-hash parameter, identified as _hash in the contract code.

It was one real order, reused again and again, for trades it never authorised.

The attacker could therefore attach the description of a legitimate burner order to a fraudulent order that sold different tokens, requested USDC rather than crvUSD and designated an attacker-controlled recipient.

Because the burner had granted CoW Protocol unlimited allowances for supported tokens, successful authorization allowed the orders to settle against its holdings. The exchange’s competing solvers executed the fraudulent orders at prices close to market, according to Curve’s reconstruction.

The failure involved Curve’s signature-verification implementation, not a demonstrated compromise of CoW Protocol’s settlement contracts.

A related authorization problem was examined in DaveFinances’ earlier reporting on a Vultisig signing vulnerability, where a manual message-signing interface could process raw digests without the expected message-domain protection. That finding concerned wallet software and did not establish an exploit, while Curve’s defective contract verification resulted in confirmed financial losses.

Balancer reportedly suffered the same exploit earlier

Bitquery’s November 17 investigation identified what it described as an earlier exploitation of the same validation weakness in Balancer’s Ethereum fee-burner contracts.

According to the firm’s transaction reconstruction, an attacker executed 26 fraudulent orders between 02:13 and 02:30 UTC on October 24, extracting approximately 0.64 ETH, valued at $1,512 at the time.

Each transaction reportedly reused the signature data from a legitimate Balancer order while redirecting the actual trade proceeds to another wallet. The attacker sold 26 token balances, with the largest individual holding valued at approximately $286.

And Balancer appears to have had the same problem first.

Bitquery examined 11,021 fee-burner sales across Ethereum, Arbitrum, Base and Optimism, identifying 164 transactions whose proceeds were directed away from their designated protocol fee collectors. Of those, 138 belonged to Curve’s confirmed November exploit and 26 to the alleged Balancer incident.

The firm reported finding no on-chain transfers connecting the two attackers. Their methods were similar, but the available evidence does not establish that the same individual or group conducted both operations.

Bitquery also reported finding no public Balancer disclosure acknowledging the October fee-burner loss. Its findings remain an independently reconstructed incident rather than an officially confirmed Balancer loss.

The researcher could not establish whether comparable contracts on every other network had experienced unauthorized activity, leaving the investigation’s coverage incomplete.

Curve has separately acknowledged that its CowSwapBurner code was reused by external projects and said it notified operators of known derived deployments before publishing the vulnerability.

Previous DeFi incidents have exposed similar weaknesses at the boundaries between trusted contracts and external modules. In October, an attacker exploited an authorization failure involving a third-party Aave module, as detailed in DaveFinances’ report on the $305,000 Safe multisig exploit. That incident involved a different contract mechanism but similarly showed how an incorrectly implemented authorization check could permit unintended asset transfers.

Stolen fees reach Hyperliquid as Curve prepares replacement

Curve’s investigation traced the stolen USDC through several subsequent transactions.

Within four hours of the attack beginning, the exploiter exchanged 37,611.76 USDC for ETH, distributed the assets across four addresses and bridged them to Arbitrum.

Approximately 37,229.89 USDC subsequently reached Hyperliquid, where the attacker exchanged the funds for 65.41 XMR1, a Monero-linked asset. According to Curve’s November 17 disclosure, that balance had not moved as of November 16.

The use of Hyperliquid resembles other reported movements of suspected exploit proceeds through decentralized trading infrastructure. DaveFinances previously examined $40 million in Hyperliquid trading positions attributed by an on-chain investigator to the Drift Protocol exploiter, although that attribution was not independently established. No connection between those wallets and the Curve attacker has been demonstrated.

On November 15, the Curve attacker converted the remainig 594 USDC into ETH and subsequently deposited 0.3 ETH into Tornado Cash.

Curve has not reported recovering any of the stolen assets. The transactions identify where portions of the proceeds moved but do not establish the attacker’s identity.

The Emergency DAO responded on November 10 after recieving an external vulnerability report at approximately 12:40 UTC. An emergency transaction was proposed at 13:39 UTC and executed at 13:59 UTC, disabling fee collection and exchange operations on Ethereum.

Equivalent precautionary actions followed on Arbitrum and Base at 16:55 UTC. Curve reported finding no fraudulent orders on Arbitrum or Gnosis.

On November 17, the Emergency DAO transferred residual token balances from the old burner contracts on Ethereum, Base and Arbitrum back to their respective FeeCollector contracts.

Ethereum fee conversion remains paused while collected fees continue accruing. Curve said those accumulating fees have not been lost.

DAO proposal 1524, opened on November 13 and scheduled to close on November 20, seeks authorization to replace the vulnerable CowSwapBurner with a contract using descending-price auctions.

The replacement includes a corrected verification mechanism requiring the hash submitted through ERC-1271 to match the actual order inspected by the contract. It also changes the fee-sale process rather than relying solely on the previous standing-order arrangement.

The DAO has a replacement to vote on, but for now, no conversion.

Curve has not announced a confirmed date for resuming Ethereum fee conversions, and the proposed replacement remains subject to the governance process.

For CRV holders and participants in Curve’s DAO revenue system, the direct financial loss is limited to the approximately $38,206 in collected fees. The interrupted conversion process introduces a seperate operational consideration: fees continue accumulating until a functioning replacement becomes available.

The incident also raises a specific issue for projects running derivatives of the same public code. Curve has advised those operators to review their deployments, while Bitquery’s reported discovery at Balancer indicates that the defective authorization logic may have been exploited outside Curve before its public disclosure.

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Johan Shamshad is Editor-in-Chief at Dave Finances, covering financial markets, digital assets, trading platforms, brokers, fintech, payments and regulation. Since 2023, he has also worked as an editor at Gulf News, the UAE English-language newspaper published by Al Nisr Publishing LLC. His work focuses on market-moving developments, company disclosures, regulatory changes and trading infrastructure, with an emphasis on primary-source verification and practical context for traders and investors.

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