The forex and CFD broker announced the new arrangement in its fourth security report on October 30, expanding its response to the incident that exposed trading credentials stored on GMO’s virtual private servers. Payments are scheduled to begin appearing sequentially in eligible customers’ trading accounts on November 2, 2026, at 03:00 UTC.

The announcement introduces a new financial commitment beyond the compensation arrangements previously communicated by both companies. However, BigBoss has not yet clarified how many customers qualify, whether the additional payment extends beyond MASS copy-trading accounts or how it will interact with existing reimbursement procedures.

BigBoss Sets Out Additional Payment Terms

Under the October 30 announcement, eligible customers will receive two separate benefits calculated against losses incurred in the relevant unauthorized transactions.

The first is a cash payment equivalent to 10% of the qualifying losses. The second covers the full amount of bonus credit lost through those transactions, effectively restoring the promotional trading credit removed from affected accounts.

BigBoss describes the arrangement as an ex-gratia payment and explicitly states that it is being introduced in addition to the compensation procedures already established for customers affected by the incident.

The distribution process is scheduled to begin on November 2 at 03:00 GMT, with payments reflected in trading accounts sequentially rather than necessarily appearing in every eligible account simultaneously.

Customers will be able to monitor the cash balance through the Trading History section of their BigBoss MyPage accounts. Restored bonus credit will appear in the Credit field on MetaTrader 4 and MetaTrader 5.

Although the announcement describes the first component as cash, it does not explain whether customers can immediately withdraw the credited amount or whether additional account conditions apply. The broker has also not disclosed whether the 10% calculation is subject to a minimum payment, maximum limit or other restrictions.

The new arrangement follows BigBoss’s October 27 announcement promising full compensation, including bonus credit, to customers who experienced unauthorized transactions or unforeseen losses while using copy trading through a MASS Account.

That earlier commitment was specifically directed at MASS Account users. Customers were instructed to contact support so the broker could examine their trading activity and initiate individual compensation procedures. The development was covered in BigBoss’s October 27 full-compensation commitment.

The October 30 announcement is significant because it introduces an additional cash component. However, the broker has not explicitly stated whether the new 10% payment applies to the same MASS Account customers, extends to other affected customers or covers a broader category of unauthorized transactions.

The GMO Incident Reached Customers’ Trading Accounts

The compensation developments originate from unauthorized access to Onamae.com Desktop Cloud, a remote Windows server service operated by GMO Internet and used by traders to run MetaTrader terminals and automated trading strategies.

GMO began investigating the incident on October 19 after receiving a customer inquiry. On October 20, it confirmed that malicious software had been installed in some customer server environments. The company subsequently began shutting down servers across its Desktop Cloud plans to prevent further damage.

GMO identified as many as 26,739 potentially affected server environments. This figure represents the potential scope of exposure rather than the number of servers confirmed to have been compromised.

The incident became a direct financial concern after customers reported trading-account operations they did not recognize. GMO warned that login credentials stored on the affected servers, including passwords used for MT4 and MT5 accounts, might have been accessed by unauthorized parties.

GMO later confirmed that security vulnerabilities existed in its service environment and that customer information had been taken outside the company. Its compensation framework covers realized losses from unauthorized transactions that its investigation confirms were connected to the incident.

The shutdown of the infrastructure was therefore more than a temporary interruption for automated traders. It also raised questions about the security of brokerage credentials stored on external servers. Dave Finances previously examined GMO Internet’s shutdown of its FX trading VPS service and the potential consequences for traders relying on continuously operating MetaTrader systems.

The broader implications have also appeared elsewhere in Japan’s brokerage industry. AvaTrade Japan acknowledged unauthorized account access and trading activity involving customers using external services, including VPS providers. Its disclosure raised separate questions about responsibility for losses originating from compromised third-party infrastructure, as discussed in AvaTrade Japan’s confirmation of unauthorized customer trades.

There is no evidence in BigBoss’s October 30 announcement that its own trading infrastructure was compromised. The disclosed incident originated in the external hosting environment operated by GMO.

Eligibility and Reimbursement Questions Remain

The most important unanswered question concerns the population covered by the new arrangement.

BigBoss’s October 27 commitment explicitly referred to customers using copy trading through MASS Accounts. The October 30 report uses broader wording, referring to eligible customers who incurred losses in relevant transactions. However, it does not provide a detailed eligibility definition or explicitly confirm that customers outside the MASS Account group qualify.

The relationship between the new 10% payment and the existing full-compensation commitment also needs clarification. BigBoss says the goodwill payment is additional to its established compensation procedures, but it has not explained how the two arrangements will be calculated when a customer qualifies for both.

For example, a customer who suffered a qualifying unauthorized loss through a MASS Account may already be entitled to full compensation under the October 27 announcement. It remains unclear whether that customer will receive the additional 10% cash payment on top of the full reimbursement and restored bonus credit.

The broker has also not disclosed the total value of the affected transactions, the number of customers expected to receive payments or its aggregate financial provision for the incident.

These details matter because a percentage-based goodwill payment can represent a substantial financial commitment when the underlying losses are large. Without an aggregate figure, investors and customers cannot assess the overall cost of the arrangement or its potential impact on the broker.

Why the Additional Payment Matters for Broker Risk

The October 30 announcement represents a meaningful development in how BigBoss is addressing customer losses. Rather than relying exclusively on the compensation process established by the infrastructure provider, the broker is introducing its own additional financial measure.

That distinction is important for customers whose trading accounts were affected by an incident originating outside the brokerage’s own systems. It also highlights the growing financial and reputational consequences of relying on external technology providers for critical trading infrastructure.

Japan’s Financial Services Agency has separately highlighted the importance of third-party cybersecurity risk management in financial institutions, reflecting the broader regulatory attention being given to vulnerabilities introduced through external service providers.

For brokers, outsourcing infrastructure does not eliminate the commercial consequences when customers experience losses through that infrastructure. Even where the original security failure occurs elsewhere, customers generally expect their brokerage to explain what happened, investigate disputed transactions and provide a clear remediation process.

The next important developments will be the November 2 payment rollout and BigBoss’s clarification of eligibility. A breakdown of the affected customer population, aggregate losses, payment conditions and the relationship between the 10% goodwill arrangement and full reimbursement would provide a much clearer picture of the broker’s financial commitment.

For now, BigBoss has introduced an additional cash benefit and promised to restore lost bonus credit. That is a meaningful expansion of its response, but it should not yet be interpreted as a blanket compensation guarantee covering every customer affected by the wider GMO cyberattack.

BigBoss halts three crypto pairs for 91 hours

BigBoss has suspended trading in three Bitcoin-related markets on its CRYPTOS cryptocurrency platform for a scheduled 91-hour maintenance window surrounding the Bitcoin hard fork, preventing customers from opening or closing positions until November 2.

The restriction began on October 29 at 08:00 UTC and is scheduled to end on November 2 at 03:00 UTC. The affected instruments are BTCUSDT, BTCJPY and ETHBTC. BigBoss says the maintenance is intended to address operational considerations associated with the Bitcoin fork and warns customers about potential price volatility around the event.

Unlike restrictions that merely suspend new orders while allowing customers to close existing positions, BigBoss’s Japanese-language announcement explicitly includes new orders, closing transactions and modifications to limit orders. The measure therefore removes customers’ ability to manage exposure through the three affected markets throughout the scheduled period.

Three CRYPTOS Markets Go Offline Through November 2

BigBoss announced the maintenance on October 29, identifying three BTC-related trading instruments on its CRYPTOS cryptocurrency exchange platform:

BTCUSDT, BTCJPY and ETHBTC.

The scheduled maintenance runs from 08:00 UTC on October 29 until 03:00 UTC on November 2, equivalent to 91 hours. The Japanese-language announcement gives the same period as 17:00 JST on October 29 through 12:00 JST on November 2.

The scope of the restriction is particularly important for active traders. BigBoss’s Japanese notice explicitly includes new orders, position-closing transactions and modifications to limit orders. Customers therefore cannot simply continue managing existing exposure while waiting for the platform to reopen.

This is materially different from a close-only arrangement, under which traders cannot open additional positions but can still exit existing ones. During the BigBoss maintenance window, both opening and closing transactions are unavailable for the affected instruments.

The announcement does not explain whether existing positions will remain open throughout the restriction, whether outstanding limit orders will be cancelled or retained, or whether any automatic position-management procedures will apply.

These omissions are important because cryptocurrency markets remain active throughout the maintenance period. Bitcoin prices can move substantially while customers are unable to modify or close their positions on the affected platform.

BigBoss also advises customers to refrain from depositing, withdrawing or transferring BTC around the hard fork because of the possibility of significant price movements. This is a precautionary recommendation rather than confirmation that all BTC funding services have been technically disabled.

The broker further states that the maintenance end time may change depending on operational progress. November 2 at 03:00 UTC should therefore be treated as the scheduled reopening time rather than an unconditional guarantee.

The Restriction Coincides With the eCash Bitcoin Fork

BigBoss attributes the maintenance to the Bitcoin hard fork. The underlying development is the launch of eCash, or ECX, a separate cryptocurrency network that branches from Bitcoin’s existing ledger.

The fork was scheduled around Bitcoin block height 973,728. That block was reached on October 29, at approximately 19:14 UTC, meaning the fork occurred after BigBoss had already started its maintenance window.

There is an important technical distinction here. The development does not mean that the original Bitcoin network has been replaced or that BTC holders must migrate to a different version of Bitcoin. Instead, ECX created a separate network using Bitcoin’s historical ledger as its starting point, while the original Bitcoin blockchain continued operating independently.

Bitcoin’s developer documentation defines a hard fork as a permanent divergence in a blockchain. In this case, the new ECX network represents the separate chain created from the Bitcoin ledger rather than a change imposed on the existing BTC network itself.

The eCash project is built around the idea of introducing optional sidechains through its Drivechains design. Its development references Bitcoin Improvement Proposals BIP 300 and BIP 301, which describe mechanisms involving hashrate escrows and blind merged mining.

The distinction matters because exchange restrictions surrounding a new fork can affect more than ordinary Bitcoin trading. Exchanges and custodians may need to assess how they handle the new asset, whether existing BTC balances qualify for the fork-related allocation and how to protect customers against operational or transaction risks during the transition.

However, BigBoss has not announced whether it will distribute ECX to eligible CRYPTOS customers, support ECX deposits and withdrawals or introduce a corresponding trading market.

The existence of a separate forked asset should not automatically be interpreted as confirmation that customers holding BTC through a centralized platform will receive the new cryptocurrency. That depends on the platform’s custody arrangements and its decision to support the fork.

A Trading Halt Is Broader Than a Funding Pause

The most significant aspect of BigBoss’s announcement is the decision to suspend trading itself rather than limiting the restrictions to Bitcoin deposits and withdrawals.

Crypto exchanges frequently interrupt funding services during wallet maintenance or network upgrades while allowing customers to continue trading with balances already held on the platform. Binance’s previous wallet upgrade, for example, suspended deposits and withdrawals while keeping its trading services operational, as explained in Dave Finances’ coverage of Binance’s wallet maintenance.

BigBoss has taken a broader approach. Its three affected CRYPTOS markets will not support new transactions or position-closing operations during the maintenance period. Customers with open positions consequently face a period in which they cannot react through those markets to changes in Bitcoin’s price.

Similar distinctions have appeared in other exchange incidents. Kraken, for example, moved WMTX and EGLD markets into trading restrictions while investigating separate security-related problems. The cases demonstrate how an exchange’s decision to restrict trading can have different implications from a simple funding interruption. Dave Finances previously examined Kraken’s restrictions on WMTX and EGLD trading.

Hard forks can also create more complicated operational requirements for blockchain networks. MultiversX, for example, prepared a coordinated hard fork from a known-good checkpoint following a virtual-machine exploit, with exchanges expected to restore services in stages after the network recovery. The earlier development is covered in Dave Finances’ report on the MultiversX hard fork.

BigBoss’s current restriction is different because it is scheduled maintenance rather than an emergency response to a confirmed exploit or a failure affecting Bitcoin’s original blockchain. There is no evidence that the announcement reflects financial distress, a liquidity problem or a wider failure of the CRYPTOS platform.

Open Positions and ECX Eligibility Remain Unclear

The most immediate concern for customers is how the broker will handle positions that remain open when the maintenance begins. Since closing transactions and limit-order modifications are included in the restriction, traders may be unable to respond to significant market movements through the affected markets.

BigBoss has not publicly explained whether existing orders will remain active, whether any orders will be cancelled automatically or whether open positions will be subject to special treatment during the maintenance window.

The absence of a close-only facility is particularly relevant to leveraged traders. A market movement against an existing position can change its margin requirements and increase liquidation risk. The maintenance notice does not provide a separate explanation of how margin monitoring or forced-liquidation procedures will operate during the suspension.

The second major question concerns the new ECX asset. BigBoss has not clarified whether customer BTC balances held through CRYPTOS will qualify for the fork-related distribution, whether it intends to credit ECX to eligible accounts or whether the new cryptocurrency will be supported after the maintenance period.

The distinction between the underlying Bitcoin network and an exchange’s own trading infrastructure is equally important. Bitcoin continued operating after the ECX fork, but that does not mean customers can access every BTC-related trading service through every exchange during the transition.

For now, the restriction should be treated as a scheduled, asset-specific trading suspension rather than a general Bitcoin network outage. The next important developments are whether BigBoss completes maintenance on schedule, how it handles existing customer positions and whether it provides any clarification regarding ECX support.

With 91 hours of scheduled trading restrictions, the measure goes considerably further than a routine pause on deposits and withdrawals. Its eventual reopening conditions and treatment of existing positions will determine how disruptive the maintenance proves for customers using BigBoss’s CRYPTOS platform.