Wed. Nov 18th, 2026

Paytaca hit by two attacks on wallet backend

ByJohan Shamshad

November 18, 2026 #Paytaca
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Bitcoin Cash wallet provider Paytaca has disclosed two cybersecurity attacks on consecutive days, with attackers exploiting vulnerabilities in its backend infrastructure to generate fraudulent peer-to-peer trading orders and unsolicited payment requests.

The incidents occurred on November 17 and 18, according to a security advisory published by Paytaca on Wednesday. The company said the attacks did not compromise customers’ private keys, which remain stored on their devices under its self-custody model. Paytaca has not reported any confirmed financial losses or disclosed how many users were affected.

Attackers exploited two backend vulnerabilities

The first incident occurred on November 17, when attackers exploited a vulnerability in Paytaca’s P2P Ramp backend to create fraudulent trading orders. The service allows users to exchange Bitcoin Cash (BCH) directly with other participants using payment methods such as bank transfers and electronic wallets.

On November 18, attackers exploited another backend vulnerability to generate payment requests that users had not initiated. It was the P2P service first, the payment-request function next.

Paytaca described the attacks as involving seperate backend vulnerabilities but did not identify their technical causes, the initial access methods or whether the same individuals were responsible for both incidents.

The company said its security team was investigating the attacks, implementing fixes and strengthening safeguards. It has not provided a completion date for those measures or published a technical incident report.

Neither the number of fraudulent orders nor the number of unauthorized payment requests has been disclosed. Paytaca also has not established publicly how many customers recieved suspicious requests or whether anyone acted on them.

Private keys remained secure, Paytaca says

Paytaca stressed that the compromised infrastructure did not contain the private keys required to authorize cryptocurrency transfers. Its self-custodial architecture stores those keys locally on customers’ devices rather than on company-operated servers.

Not the private keys, Paytaca says. Moving funds requires cryptographic signatures generated using those locally stored credentials, meaning access to the compromised backend alone would not provide the signing authority needed to transfer customers’ BCH.

An order in an app is one thing, an authorized transfer another. Attackers able to generate convincing payment requests could potentially persuade users to authorize transactions they never intended to make, even without obtaining their private keys. Paytaca has not confirmed that such deception occurred or resulted in a transfer.

The company advised customers to disregard suspicious P2P orders and unsolicited payment requests, avoid signing transactions they did not initiate, and never disclose their recovery phrases or private keys.

A related issue appeared in an earlier phishing campaign impersonating the Safe wallet, where attackers used a counterfeit website to present users with a seemingly legitimate wallet interface. That incident involved an external fraudulent website rather than a confirmed compromise of Safe’s infrastructure.

Earlier wallet attacks exposed different weaknesses

Paytaca’s disclosure follows other cryptocurrency security incidents involving infrastructure surrounding digital wallets, although the methods and reported consequences differ considerably.

In September, cryptocurrency exchange Bitget attributed approximately $387.5 million in unauthorized transfers to attackers manipulating transaction data inside its wallet backend. As detailed in DaveFinances’ reporting on the Bitget backend security breach, the exchange maintained that its private keys had not been stolen, but attackers had reached infrastructure capable of feeding false transaction instructions into an existing authorization process.

That case ended with a loss, a very large one. Bitget’s exchange-operated signing infrastructure also differs from Paytaca’s model, in which individual wallet owners retain the keys needed to authorize transfers.

A separate November incident affected Keplr users after a vulnerability in Web3Auth infrastructure exposed private-key material associated with certain social-login wallets. An on-chain investigation identified at least $6.01 million in affected assets, according to the earlier report on the Keplr wallet attack.

Keplr’s incident involved compromised signing credentials, whereas Paytaca says its attackers were able to manipulate backend-generated requests without obtaining the credentials controlling customers’ funds.

No confirmed theft or affected-user count

Paytaca’s initial disclosure leaves several operational questions unresolved, including whether fraudulent orders reached the settlement stage, whether unsolicited payment requests appeared in customers’ wallets and how the company detected the two intrusions.

The security team has not published an independant forensic assessment or provided evidence establishing the full scope of the compromises. There is also no disclosed count of suspicious transactions that users rejected, although such information could help determine how widely the malicious requests circulated.

Paytaca said it was introducing additonal safeguards and continuing to monitor for suspicious activity, but it has not described the specific changes made to order creation, payment-request authorization or backend access controls.

The immediate precaution for wallet holders is to verify every unexpected request before authorizing payment. The US Federal Trade Commission offers similar advice in its guidance on unexpected payment requests, recommending independent confirmation of the recipient and the legitimacy of the request.

And for now there is no count to test against. Paytaca’s assertion that private keys remained protected addresses one potential route to unauthorized withdrawals, while the extent of customer exposure to fraudulent orders and payment requests remains undisclosed.

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Johan Shamshad is Editor-in-Chief at Dave Finances, covering financial markets, digital assets, trading platforms, brokers, fintech, payments and regulation. Since 2023, he has also worked as an editor at Gulf News, the UAE English-language newspaper published by Al Nisr Publishing LLC. His work focuses on market-moving developments, company disclosures, regulatory changes and trading infrastructure, with an emphasis on primary-source verification and practical context for traders and investors.

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