The development comes from a Reddit post published on September 6 containing what the user says is an email received from MEXC the same day. The correspondence has not been independently authenticated with MEXC, and the trader’s allegations concerning the liquidation, account restrictions and subsequent legal proceedings remain unverified.
According to the reproduced email, MEXC said the BOXCAT Fair Price was generated in real time using the pricing mechanism and reference information available at that specific moment, including the relevant index price and funding-related parameters.
The exchange’s customer-service team then made a potentially important distinction.
It said it was unable to reconstruct every underlying system input on a second-by-second basis after the event and independently reproduce a manual calculation for the historical timestamp. MEXC argued that this inability did not mean the original Fair Price had been fabricated and said calculations submitted by the customer lacked the complete reference values used by its system.
The alleged response also said the BOXCAT calculation referenced MEXC’s own spot market as an applicable price source. MEXC told the customer that historical spot trading information or records involving other users that could not be provided directly could be reviewed if a competent law-enforcement or judicial authority submitted a valid request through the appropriate channel.
MEXC further rejected the customer’s allegations that it had locked the account, deleted information or misappropriated assets, saying its review had found no evidence supporting those claims. The reproduced email invited the user to provide screenshots, timestamps or other records relating to any alleged account restriction.
The trader disputes that account and says the underlying incident occurred on August 21, 2025, involving a short position in the BOXCATUSDT perpetual contract.
The user’s latest post says MEXC’s Fair Price reached 0.0004651 while the exchange’s own market data allegedly showed prices between approximately 0.00020 and 0.00028. The trader calculated a Fair Price of approximately 0.000218 and argues that the liquidation level was therefore inconsistent with the market.
None of those reconstructed figures has been independently verified.
There is also a small discrepancy within the trader’s own public account. In a February Reddit post about the same incident, the user put the disputed Fair Price at 0.0004662 rather than 0.0004651, while again saying the last price was around 0.00020. That makes the original account statement, liquidation record and timestamp-level system data particularly important for establishing the exact figures.
What can be independently established is how MEXC says its liquidation system is supposed to work.
MEXC states that futures liquidations are triggered using Fair Price rather than the latest traded price. Its current methodology calculates Fair Price as the median of three values: a funding-rate premium derived from the index price, a mid-price basis calculation incorporating the index price and order-book information, and the futures contract’s latest traded price.
The purpose, according to MEXC, is precisely to protect traders against unnecessary liquidations caused by illiquidity, manipulation or temporary abnormal price movements.
Index construction adds another layer. MEXC says an index can contain weighted prices from multiple exchanges and that it uses safeguards including exclusion of delayed data and, under normal circumstances, exclusion of individual exchange prices deviating by more than 1% from the median when at least three price sources are available.
The alleged BOXCAT email is therefore significant because MEXC reportedly told this customer that its own spot market was an applicable reference source for the disputed calculation.
BOXCAT was a relatively new and high-risk contract at the time. MEXC listed BOXCATUSDT perpetual futures on May 30, 2025, with leverage of as much as 50 times. The underlying BOXCAT token had entered MEXC’s Innovation Zone days earlier, with MEXC itself warning that prices for projects in that section could fluctuate significantly.
The liquidation allegedly occurred on August 21. One day later, MEXC announced that BOXCATUSDT futures would be removed on August 28 along with six other perpetual contracts. MEXC said remaining positions would be closed at Fair Price when the delisting occurred.
The trader now says the matter has reached Turkish cybercrime authorities and court proceedings. Those claims are repeated across several Reddit posts, but no corresponding public court document or statement from a Turkish authority was identified during searches for this article.
That leaves the September 6 email as an important but still unverified development. Authentication from MEXC — and ideally the original Fair Price, index-price, funding and order-book records — would be necessary before drawing conclusions about whether the liquidation itself was calculated correctly.
The Real Issue Is Whether a Liquidation Can Be Audited Afterward
There are two very different questions buried inside this dispute.
The first is whether MEXC’s BOXCAT Fair Price was wrong on August 21, 2025.
There is currently not enough independently verified evidence to answer that.
The second is whether an exchange should be capable of explaining, after the fact, exactly how the price that liquidated a leveraged customer was produced.
That question is more interesting.
A mark-price system exists because the last traded price can be unreliable, particularly in thin markets. If somebody places a tiny trade at an absurd price, a trader should not necessarily lose an entire leveraged position because of it. MEXC’s own documentation presents Fair Price as protection against exactly that problem.
But moving liquidation away from an observable traded price creates another requirement: auditability.
A trader can look at a historical candle and see where transactions occurred. A synthetic Fair Price is different. It may depend on the index, exchange weights, funding rate, time remaining before funding, bid and ask prices and moving averages calculated at that instant.
If those inputs cannot later be reproduced, a customer cannot independently verify the number that triggered the liquidation.
There is an important caveat in the alleged MEXC response. It says Customer Service cannot perform a second-by-second reconstruction. It does not clearly say that MEXC’s underlying trading systems, risk department or databases possess no historical records.
That distinction could determine whether this is an ordinary support limitation or a more serious record-retention issue.
MEXC evidently retains substantial historical customer information. Its account-export service currently says users can obtain up to three years of futures position history, order history, trade history, capital flows and futures statements, with records available from October 1, 2024 onward.
Those customer records are not the same thing as historical pricing-engine inputs, however.
For this dispute, the decisive evidence would be more granular: the exact index value, its constituent price source or sources, funding-rate input, remaining funding interval, bid and ask data, basis moving average, last price and the resulting Fair Price at the liquidation timestamp.
If MEXC can provide those records to a court or law-enforcement agency but not through customer service, its latest alleged response is much less extraordinary. A support agent not having access to sensitive tick-level infrastructure data is understandable.
If MEXC itself can no longer reconstruct those inputs, the question becomes considerably bigger.
A leveraged exchange is effectively acting as calculation agent, risk manager and execution venue simultaneously. When its own derived number can forcibly close a customer’s position, users have to trust that the calculation was correct. The ability to audit that calculation after a dispute is therefore part of what makes that trust defensible.
The BOXCAT trader has not yet proved that MEXC generated an incorrect price. A Reddit post and reproduced email are not enough to establish that.
But the alleged September 6 response has sharpened the dispute in a useful way.
The most important question is no longer whether BOXCAT traded at 0.0004651. MEXC’s own methodology means an actual trade at precisely the Fair Price is not necessarily required.
The better question is whether MEXC can produce the underlying data showing why its system arrived at that Fair Price at that second.
An authenticated answer to that question could either largely resolve the trader’s accusation or turn a year-old customer complaint into a much more significant story about the auditability of crypto derivatives liquidations.